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One Day That Shook the World

THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR has profoundly modified the international situation throughout the world. In this vast bonfire old ideas, policies, hatreds and loyalties are destroyed in an instant. One world came to an end with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact on August 23, 1939; another may well have disappeared when the fighting began on Sunday morning, June 22, 1941.

Post-mortems are valuable only in so far as they contain a guide to the future. If we now emphasize the fact that Stalin brought his troubles upon himself, we do so not for the pleasure of being able to say "I told you so," but because of the lesson to be learned. The Soviet Union under Stalin has sacrificed one by one practically all the principles which made the Russian revolution twenty-four years ago flame like a glorious hope across the heavens for millions of suffering people around the world. His last and greatest concession came when he struck hands with the deadliest enemy of communism, the "bloodthirsty guttersnipe," as Mr. Churchill has just called him in a striking phrase, and by so doing released upon this planet the horrors of a second world war. It is safe to assume that even a few days ago, Stalin was prepared to make tremendous sacrifices to avoid the German assault. No one ever tried appeasement harder than he did. Yet it got him nothing. If human beings were guided by reason and really acted in the light of experience, we should hear no more talk of appeasement from anybody, in relation to Germany or any of her partners.

It is hardly worth while to discuss seriously Hitler's formal public statements about the reasons for anything that he does. He has not only broken practically every promise he ever made, but he has publicly recommended wholesale lying, in his book which the world still refuses to read and to take seriously, at great danger to itself. Of his claim that he is now conducting a crusade on behalf of civilization against communism, the answer is that for nearly two years he has been the best and almost the only friend that Bolshevism has had. He turns against it now, not because he is suddenly stricken with a sense of its iniquities but because he wants Russian oil and wheat and wants to make his rear secure before he starts his last great assault upon the British Isles.

To be sure, there are many people in England and the United States who dislike the Russians as much as or more than they do the Nazis. An important part of appeasement has always been the idea that perhaps Germany, England and the United States might join in an assault upon the USSR. To such people Winston Churchill made the final and effective answer in his radio broadcast on the first day of the new war. Everyone knows that Churchill for many years has been the foe of communism. Yet he did not hesitate to pledge the resources of Great Britain, to be supplemented no doubt by those of the Commonwealth, to aid Russia in resisting the German attack. For it is Hitler and Hitlerism that are the real and ultimate danger. In memorable words Mr. Churchill said:

CONTENTS

The Week 871
Editorials
Hitler's Plan of Campaign 874
Get Tougher with Japan 876
Flip-flop 877
General Articles
Gold Policy and Foreign Policy . . . . . Charles R. Whittlesey 878
A British View of Union Now 880
The Boom Nobody Wanted . Carey McWilliams 882
Why Japan Hesitates . . . H. N. Brailsford 884
Poem . . . . Sylvia Townsend Warner 885
Washington Notes . . . . . T. R. B. 886
Behind the Camera: Lang . . Otis Ferguson 887
Records: Not for Hot Weather . Stanley Ferguson 888
A Communication . . Hanson W. Baldwin 889
The Bandwagon 890
Correspondence 890
Books in Review
William L. Shirer Speaking . Malcolm Cowley 893
Love Everlasting . . . Dorothy Chamberlain 894
Russian Aftermath . . . Jesse D. Clarkson 895
Summons to Revolution . . Willmoore Kendall 895
Too Much of Too Little . . Otis Ferguson 896
Journey to the Threshold . . Quincy Howe 897
A Reader's List 898

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We have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We have resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. From this nothing will turn us. Nothing. We shall fight him by land; we shall fight him by sea; we shall fight him in the air, until, with God's help, we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its people from his yoke. Any man or state who fights against Nazism will have our aid. Any man or state who fights with Hitler is our foe.

These words indicate adequately what the policy of the United States ought to be. We do not like Stalin's government any more today when it is under attack than we did yesterday when it was still hoping to buy off the enemy. The indictment the democracies have drawn up against Moscow still stands, and it is a formidable one. But this is a life-and-death war between Nazism and the rest of the world. The Russians years ago used to talk about a worldwide revolution and for a short time they worked eagerly and warmheartedly to create it. But it is now many years since Russian communism abandoned all but the emptiest pretext of continued revolutionary effort abroad. Hitler on the other hand is already, on his record, probably the most successful world conqueror who ever lived. His ambition of universal dominance can no longer be dismissed as a megalomaniac dream. Megalomaniac dream it may be, but it has become for the rest of us a dreadful nightmare of possible slavery. In our own interest we must, like Mr. Churchill, agree that the enemy of our enemy becomes our friend. If Russia accepts our aid—and it would be madness not to do so—she will inevitably restore some of the communications with the Western world that she broke decades ago. Some of the savage practices that have grown up within her cloistered walls must be modified. If the war ends in a Hitler defeat, it is inevitable that this will be true. If it ends in a Hitler victory, Soviet Russia will be destroyed and will be succeeded by a wretched Quisling variety of Nazi state. Whatever one may think of some of the recent policies of the central government in Moscow, a whole generation has grown up in Soviet Russia loyal to the idea of the USSR and sacrificing greatly in its support. For the entire world, the swastika over Russia would be a bitter disappointment; for these humble and silent Russian millions, it would be a tragedy.

We must face the fact that there are terrible dangers for Great Britain and the United States in the German-Russian war. It is quite possible that the swaggering Hitler timetable may be right and that Russia may be conquered in a few weeks. Hitler will then turn against England with security in his rear, with vastly augmented resources and with an army strengthened by the success of a formidable campaign. England and America will have gained some time in the race for increased armament; but unless they take the utmost advantage of their opportunity, this improvement in their position will be more than offset by the improvement in Hitler's.

We therefore urge upon President Roosevelt with all the earnestness at our command that he should redouble the American war effort. The time has now come, in our judgment, when the United States should immediately go to war with the Axis. Such an action would not increase our dangers, and it would hearten the anti-Hitler forces around the world as nothing else could do.

Then let us throw out the fumbling and hesitant dollar-a-year men and others who are blocking the swift forward movement of the defense program. Let us, for the sake of our homes and our future, abandon the idea of business as usual and concentrate on war preparation to the utmost possible degree. Let us do whatever is necessary to make sure that satisfied workers in our factories give us their maximum effort. Let us tax away war profits and control prices to avoid inflation. Let us reorganize our army and navy command to make sure that they are equal to the emergency and are prepared to take full advantage of the most recent technical advance. Germany's assault on Russia is not an occasion for us to relax our efforts. Rather, it gives us a little time, with a promise that unless we use that time with maximum energy and efficiency, there is a grave danger that the whole democratic world may be destroyed.

Dance of the Powers

The problem of international allegiances has now reached the point where the citizen of any nation should be on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Those who were taught by state or party propaganda to salivate at foodbowls marked Stalin or Hitler have now been reduced to the bewildered, circular motion observed by scientists among sheep under stress. For a few big nations and for those which have no food of their own, the decision has been relatively simple. Great Britain has voted wholeheartedly for Russia, Rumania has gone to war against Russia, Hungary has broken off diplomatic relations with Russia, Spain is reported eager to pay off old obligations by sending troops to help Germany. Mexico and the United States can be considered definitely in the Russian camp, along with China, which hopes for less tension between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Spokesmen for Vichy have voted against Russia, while their Italian neighbor has boldly declared war, muttering hastily that her troops will probably not be needed. But here the clear-cut decisions come to a stop. Japan, with impeccable honesty, intends to remain faithful to both Germany and Russia. Turkey is for neutrality, plus sticking to her treaties with Germany, Russia and Great Britain. Finland is neutral but is rumored to be considering recapture of her lost territory. The Vatican deplores the spread of hostilities but loves the Communists no better. Brazil dislikes both

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sides, and we understand that Chilean Nazis and Communists, who had managed to unify their propaganda, are now horribly bewildered. The New York Ukrainians, who have always hated Russia, are being forced into the anti-German camp. But Poland, in our opinion, is in the most awkward position of all: still officially at war with Russia, she is allied to a country which has promised aid to the Soviets. General Sikorski wants Poland's old frontiers back before he helps Russia (to which, it is rumored, the Soviet has agreed) and, what's more, demands annulment of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939. The whole situation may confidently be described as a state of flux.

Piracy Is War

Woodrow Wilson's request to Congress for authorization to arm American merchantmen in 1917 precipitated one of the most dramatic scenes of the last war, the famous filibuster in the United States Senate which resulted in the defeat of the measure. President Roosevelt's formal notification to Congress that the administration regarded the sinking of the Robin Moor as an act of piracy was read to chambers scarcely a third full. There was no debate. There was no excitement. There was little dissent. Now, as then, the issue is the control of the Atlantic Ocean by a power hostile to the United States. But this time our decision had been taken months before. It is not true, however, as some are at the moment inclined to say, that words mean nothing and only "acts" count. The word piracy, formally and undisputedly applied to the acts of ships of the German navy, is a word of war. TRB, our Washington correspondent, believes that orders have already been given to United States warships to shoot at any German submarine or other vessel attacking a merchantman—any merchantman. The war is a war of wits in 1941 to a far greater degree than in 1917. The commander of the U-boat which sank the lighted and plainly marked Robin Moor made a mistake. The President acted.

Ford Does Himself a Favor

The contract finally signed between the Ford Motor Company and the United Auto Workers would be a good contract for organized labor in any concern. Accepted by Ford, it constitutes a triumph for the labor movement. No more bitter or powerful foe of the unions has existed in the United States than Henry Ford. For years he has wasted millions in a labor-baiting policy—wastage consisting both of direct expenditure in the hiring of spies and thugs and of indirect losses in the deterioration of his product and the bad will he has accumulated among prospective purchasers. Now he consents not only to collective bargaining and the fixing of wages and working conditions by signed agreement, but to the union shop and the checkoff of dues. This means that he is going to use the potentialities of the labor movement for constructive purposes, and must rely on it for discipline in efficient production, rather than upon the old and hateful secret autocracy.

We do not expect everything to go smoothly at the Ford plants from now on: it takes time to learn the processes of democratic constitutionalism in industry. But we do expect that the Ford will be a better automobile because it is not to be produced any more by terroristic speed-up, and we know that many will be more inclined to buy it. The triumph of the organized workers over their most redoubtable enemy can be, with wise leadership on the assembly line, at the same time a great gain for the consumers' interest in sound productive methods. For years Mr. Ford was mechanically ahead of his age; now he has, after years of lagging, caught up with the leaders in organizing men as well as machines.

Slamming the Door on the Refugees

The chief anti-democratic, pro-Fascist action of the week in the United States was the new policy of the American government regarding refugees from Germany. It is announced that in future no refugee will be admitted to this country who has close relatives still living in Germany. The explanation given is that the German government, by threatening to torture or kill these relatives, can force even the most reluctant refugee to become one of its secret agents in this country. All over the United States, sharp protests have already arisen against this policy. Everybody knows that the Gestapo has on occasion put the screws on refugees in this manner. But everybody knows, also, that a man under such compulsion makes a bad spy; his heart is not in his work. There are already hundreds of thousands of recent German immigrants in this country, not refugees in any sense, many of whom are sympathetic with Hitler and only too glad to do his dirty work for him. The new rule is unnecessary on any practical basis. It throws into the depths of despair many thousands of refugees to whom tentative consent had already been given for entrance to this country. There will be many people all over the world who will believe that the motive for this action comes not from genuine concern about Nazi spies but from the same little nest of anti-Semites and anti-democrats in the State Department who have in the past done so much to muddy the waters of our democratic efforts.

Some Guildsmen Went Wrong

The left-wing leaders of the New York Newspaper Guild made a bad mistake with their resolution backing the strike in the North American plane plant. Their attitude was disavowed by a large proportion of their membership, as well as by guildsmen in other cities. President Thomas of the United Auto Workers rebuked them for interfering in the democratic discipline of a fellow organization by supporting an unauthorized strike. At the Guild convention these leaders defended

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themselves by proclaiming that since the labor movement is opposed to the use of troops against strikers, they were right in supporting any strike which was suppressed by military force. Surely this is both bad logic and bad trade unionism. If they had confined their statement to opposition to the employment of troops, they would have had a defensible position. If the Guild officers had accompanied that attitude with an admonition to the strikers to give better service to democracy both in the nation and in the unions by living up to their agreement and their constitution, the pronouncement would have been far stronger. As it is, the resolution appears like a readiness to use any excuse to encourage interference with defense production.

The Wings Begin to Spread

We do not know whether the British government was given advance notice by Sir Stafford Cripps of the present Russo-German hostilities. We do know that London was aware of the movement of German forces from west to east and that the RAF seized its opportunity to demonstrate its growing strength. For more than two weeks large numbers of British bombers have attacked the Ruhr with their new super-bombs in an unequaled series of night raids. As Germany has moved to the east, the RAF has moved after her, extending its aerial supremacy over England to the sky above the French coast. These daylight raids have been made by powerful bomber-fighter combinations, and British sources announce that the forces employed are comparable to those of the Germans in last year's Battle of Britain. At that time, on August 30, 800 Nazi bombers and fighters came over England. On September 7, the London docks were attacked by 350. On September 15, there were 500 over southern England. The real difference betwen the Battle of Britain and the present RAF offensive seems to lie in their respective costs: 2,375 German aircraft were destroyed in the Battle of Britain, while in the present attacks the RAF claims to have kept its own small losses at a fraction of those of the German defenders. Even if Hitler is not destined to a long struggle with his new enemy, our growing and now visible aid to the RAF must make itself increasingly felt.

Last Week

The new line of the Communist Party in the United States will be decided at a meeting of the Communist National Committee on June 28. . . . A fresh-water college once decided that the need of the times required more ivy about the institution in the way of ancient traditions. The Student Council duly met and voted the following resolution: "It is a tradition in this college that freshmen may not walk on the path beside the chapel. This tradition will go into effect next Monday." . . . Editorial writers were happy last week when they remembered that they did not work for the Communist National Committee, especially in this hot weather. . . . The pearl of thought for the seven days of hard intellectual labor was produced by Senator Harry S. Truman of Independence, Missouri, who figured out that the safety of his country could best be advanced by having it aid either Germany or Russia, according to which one was losing. . . . Paul Block, publisher of The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, The Toledo Blade, The Toledo Times and at various moments six other newspapers, died in New York City. He was the writer who used to like his own editorials so well he would buy space in other newspapers to reprint them. Their general idea was: save our country from the Red New Deal, in thick black type. He made his money in the advertising business. . . . Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi died in Washington and his colleagues were sorrowful. . . . The Louisville Courier-Journal was the object of a frenzied attack and boycott led by the Catholic clergy of Kentucky, for publishing a full-page birth-control advertisement, paid for by the National Committee for Planned Parenthood and the Birth Control Federation of America, Inc. Editor Agar stood his ground. . . . Forty-nine percent of the nation's population is enrolled in religious bodies in the United States. The Roman Catholic Church is the largest single sect, with 21,284,455 members. Protestant churches have 36,103,984 members.

Hitler's Plan of Campaign

WHAT STRATEGIC PLAN will Hitler follow in his attack upon Russia? And what is his chance of success? The latter of these questions lies in the realm of pure prophecy. Most American military experts believe that Russia will be defeated, perhaps within a few weeks or months. They do not base this view on the weak showing Russia made against Finland, which they feel was less bad than the public supposes. They feel, however, that much of the Russian equipment is now obsolescent; that the command has suffered by the purges of the last few years; that interior communication is bad; that Hitler has the enormous advantage of the offense, since the Russians must be prepared to meet the full force of his attack at any point along a 2,000-mile front. In this view, the reason American and British help to Russia is so important is chiefly because it will make the campaign longer, and thereby give the Western democracies more time in which to arm themselves.

The first question, as to Hitler's strategy, is probably easier to answer. While the Germans use brilliant new devices in the tactics of battle, their grand strategic plans remain orthodox and even classic. The Nazi victory in the West was the result of a successful development of the old familiar Schlieffen plan. In the East, it seems almost certain that the strategy to be followed

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is that of General Max Hoffmann. Hoffmann, one of the most brilliant strategists of the Great War, largely responsible for Germany's remarkable success against Russia at that time, worked out a plan for invasion. In the early days of the Nazi Party he was extremely influential. He died fourteen years ago, but Rosenberg, dominated by his ideas, carries on his influence.

A keen analysis of the origin and nature of the Hoffmann plan may be found in the book, "Hitler Over Russia," by Ernst Henri. It is particularly significant since Henri is said to be in reality a spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Office. Writing in 1938, Henri outlined Hoffmann's plan in detail. A northern army would storm Leningrad while a southern army would occupy Austria, annihilate Czecho-Slovakia, march through Rumania to the Dardanelles and, from there, invade the Ukraine.

The storming of Leningrad, Henri prophesied, would be by land, sea and air. The first objective of this attack would be the taking of Kronstadt. "Kronstadt is impregnable," wrote Henri, "but in spite of this the new German Admiralty is planning its big attack. It is doing so because this Admiralty, just like the new army staff . . . is no longer an institution of normal, rational strategy, but a specific creation of the fascist Hoffmann plan."

The Admiralty, according to the plan, obtains a ring of sea positions in the Baltic. To this there is added a ring of air positions. Then there begins the "ride of the vanguard" against Leningrad. Leningrad is taken and a new Russian government is proclaimed.

The first four stages of the Hoffmann plan for the southern attack were already achieved when Hitler declared war upon Russia. Now, if the Hoffmann plan is followed, Hitler will strike against Kiev, Odessa, the Don basin and the Caucasus. The German armies will then join with the northern armies to threaten Moscow. It is significant that Hoffmann did not limit his proposed invasion to the Ukraine because of fear that Napoleon's disasters would be repeated. He believed that had Napoleon possessed adequate means of communication his Russian campaign, including the taking of Moscow, would have turned out to be a brilliant success.

This is a terrible picture, but Henri's conclusions are hopeful. Hoffmann, he writes, mistook the temporary rottenness of the Tsarist armies for an enduring weakness, which no longer exists under the Soviets. Only two factors are of substance in Hitler's chance of success: British aid and the obsolete character of the Russian railways. These factors are basic in Hitler's calculations. "All the rest is bluff."

The Russian railways remain obsolete. But arterial roads have been built from Moscow to Kiev and to Minsk, and new trucks now roar down these roads. Britain today is attacking Germany with a militant determination that Henri did not dare to hope for.

The war brings into conflict the two greatest armies in the world. The Germans alone can put into the offensive two million superbly trained and equipped troops. To these may be added 100,000 Finns and 500,000 Rumanians, anxious to win back what Russia has taken from them. Twenty of Germany's divisions may be Panzer divisions with 425 tanks each, four or five may be air-borne infantry divisions. Four thousand planes are probably ready to bomb Russia and to meet her bombers. In the Baltic, Germany's fleet is formidable, and in the Black Sea her submarines and torpedo boats may be reinforced by Italian vessels.

Against this force, Russia is said to have mobilized 100 infantry divisions, 22 cavalry divisions and 32 armored brigades. Altogether she is believed to possess 170 divisions of 26,000 men each, a force substantially larger than the German army. In the air, she is believed to possess more planes than Germany. Marshal Voroshilov stated in 1939 that the bomb salvo of the Soviet air force—the number of bombs which may be dropped at any time—was more than twice that of the German air force. One-fifth of Russia's air force are heavy bombers of which the best are reported to be roughly comparable in performance with the now obsolete flying fortresses.

Max Werner, a noted authority on the Soviet army, is optimistic about its ability to meet the Germans. "In the air," he states in his new book "Battle for the World," "the Wehrmacht can at best obtain parity with the Red Army. The Red Army, on the other hand, possesses the stronger tank arm and in general stronger arms for a modern war of movement."

Werner discounts the superiority of Germany's planes. Two factors, he adds, favor the Soviet Union. It has better bases for operations in Eastern Europe, and its aircraft factories are far less vulnerable than Germany's. We understand, however, that many of Russia's twenty-eight aircraft factories are in or near Leningrad, Moscow, Odessa, Sebastopol and other cities well within range of Germany's bombers.

There is little evidence of the performance of Soviet fighting planes. Fred Tinker reported from Spain that they were imitations of American types and that they were rather better than the German and Italian planes. But the performance of Red Army planes in Finland indicated that Russia had advanced less rapidly than Germany. James Aldridge described, in an uncensored report from Sweden in March, 1940, a new Russian bomber with exceptional range and a top speed of 250 miles per hour. But an engineer who reconstructed American Brewster fighters shipped to Finland reported that these fighters, which were considered hopelessly undergunned by the British, and were flown by novice pilots, were able to bring down Russian bombers with the greatest ease. The Russian fighters were said to mount only two machine guns, and only one fighter, the ZKB 19, is reported today to carry even a single

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20-millimeter machine cannon. The military intelligence of the American army believes that much of Russian equipment in tanks, anti-aircraft guns and planes is almost worthless and that in other arms, such as anti-tank guns, the Red Army is dangerously deficient.

Two other factors are important and unknown in an analysis of the war. The first is the effect of the purges; the second, the activity of fifth columnists within Russia.

Werner, who is in general pro-Soviet, is extremely alarmed at the effect of the purges. "The events of 1937-38," he wrote in "The Military Strength of the Great Powers," "the brutal purge carried out against the topmost ranks of the officer corps, the executions, arrests and degradations, the dismissals and reorganization—all carried out for political and not military reasons, have seriously damaged the officer corps of the Red Army."

The last purge of which Werner wrote was anti-German in direction and is said to have removed 40 percent of Red Army officers above the rank of major. Since then a second purge has taken place of high-ranking officers who opposed the Hitler pact; it is perhaps even more serious in effect, since it has restored to the Red Army some elements of pro-German leadership.

In addition, it seems certain that the way has been prepared within Russia, as it was within all other countries for a series of internal acts of sabotage to aid the German army. In 1936, if the Moscow trials are to be believed, many of the highest leaders of the Communist Party, the Red Army, the government and the secret service were united under German leadership in a plot to overthrow Stalin. They confessed that they had destroyed crops, sabotaged machinery, wrecked trains and given military secrets to the German Gestapo, which financed and directed their activities. They succeeded in stirring up serious nationalist uprisings among the Soviet Republics.

The particular men who admitted that they led this movement have presumably been shot, but the groups with whom they supposedly worked—the dissatisfied peasants, the former middle classes, the restless national minorities—all remain to welcome the German invaders. In the Ukraine and in White Russia, the two main border states, hatred of the Soviet government among many people is only equaled by hatred of the Germans themselves who, as absentee landlords, formerly robbed these areas of their wealth.

Russia's future depends primarily upon her people. Will they fight, as the Spanish people fought, with a courage born from a belief in their future; will they fight as the Finnish people fought, with pride in their independence; or will they fight as the French people fought, without much pride or faith, during the few weeks before they were overwhelmed?

Get Tougher with Japan

WHAT EFFECT will the Nazi-Soviet war have upon Japan and so upon the American position in the Pacific? Those who have been arguing that the United States should continue—by shipments of oil and otherwise—to bribe Japan to stay out of the Dutch East Indies, or should even try to appease her out of the Axis entirely, see in this new development an added support for their cause. Japan's hands are now freed from any threat from the Soviet Union. It is supposed to be up to us to pay her more to keep the peace.

To The New Republic it seems that this reasoning is pure delusion. Fear of assault by the Soviet Union has not yet stayed Japan's hand in any other direction in which she wished to strike. The formal neutrality pact which she recently made with the Soviet government emphasized her freedom of action, and she has used it as a diplomatic threat for all it was worth. Russia had no navy in the Pacific sufficient to restrain her in any case. Soviet airmen could bomb her cities, but only at the risk of loss of their bases.

On the contrary, the new situation confronts the Japanese statesmen with new perplexities. As an ally in Europe, Hitler had his uses, but suppose he annexes the Russian state and appears on the frontiers of India and China? He would not be so comfortable a neighbor. Suppose he gets through to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean? The ease with which the German dictator reversed his position toward Stalin must give the Japanese pause. He has no more love for yellow men than he has for Bolshevists or Jews. He aims, as he so clearly stated in "Mein Kampf," at world conquest by the German master race.

If the Japanese were tempted to undertake some new adventure by the fact that the Soviet Union is now embarrassed in the west, it could be in the direction of Vladivostok and the Siberian maritime provinces. The obvious principle of the conqueror is to kick your enemy while he is down, to take your share of the booty while your pal is robbing the same victim. This maxim dictates aggression against Russia, not assaulting the Allies or the United States while they are temporarily at least strengthened by the turning of Germany's active front away from them. And if Japan has ideas of pushing her conquests in Asia, she is less likely to try at the same time to penetrate the South Pacific.

There the situation remains as it was. The British and American naval forces in the Pacific have a ratio to the Japanese of roughly three to two. Their bases, including Singapore, are better and nearer to the region which Japan is threatening. No matter how menacing the campaign against commerce in the Atlantic becomes, the Pacific fleets will not be and need not be withdrawn to meet it. For the answer to the submarine and the raider is not the battlefleet but the small fight-

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ing vessel and airpower. The Germans have no sufficient force of capital ships to force withdrawal from the Pacific of one superdreadnaught or one battle cruiser.

We are in a position to call Japan's bluff, now more than ever. If there is any prospect of weaning her from the Axis, it is not by submitting to blackmail, because it is only her alliance with Hitler that enables her to threaten extortion. The wise course is to show her firmly the impossibility of gaining permanent advantage from her aggressive action, to keep her busy in China, to deprive her of the materials on which she depends for military power. The chances are she would not dare to start a fight with us. When she finds it impossible to frighten us any more, or to conquer the Chinese, she may be ready to talk reasonably. If, on the other hand, she insists on a test of arms, British and American power combined can confront her with that two-ocean navy which it is going to take us six years to build alone.

Flip-flop

THE COMMUNIST PARTY in the United States has been forced to make another right-about in its policy. To the comrades who were able to swallow the Nazi-Soviet pact of August, 1939, the new reversal will not be difficult. Everybody with any claim to pride in the integrity of his intellectual processes or a belief that there is such a thing as truth apart from somebody's particular brand of truth has by now deserted the ranks of the comrades. Those who are left are of tougher stock; they are prepared to swear if necessary that black is white today, black tomorrow and orange on Thursday.

It will be interesting to see just how far strikes in the defense industries have actually been of Communist origin and not for legitimate trade-union purposes. Presumably the party line will now order all possible aid to the defense effort. The editors of The New Masses and The Daily Worker would be blushing, if these gentlemen were capable of that physical phenomenon, to think how in recent months they have discouraged, verbally at least, the production of planes, tanks and guns which might now go to their Soviet fatherland to repel the Nazi invader.

The first reactions of the party leaders in this country did little to elevate the moral and intellectual tone of Communist discussion. Foster and Minor blandly insisted that Russia is the world's greatest champion of peace, overlooking the pact of '39 which made the war possible. They refer to her having "liberated" the Baltic States—which is of course one way of putting it. They still insist that the war between England and Germany is just an imperialist struggle and go out of their way to attack England on the very day that she promised all possible assistance to the defense of Russia.

For the last year, the Communist Party has pursued a campaign of hatred and contempt for any American progressive who dared to support Britain in her fight against Hitler. Every upholder of the President's policy has been smeared as "pro-British"; every statement about democracy in England has been called warmongering. For the men who braved its fire—"the weak-kneed, soft-bellied fellow travelers" who "jumped on the bandwagon of war"—it reserved its own rights of excommunication, a ruthless, savage outlawing that amounted to an attempted burial alive. The Prime Minister of Loyalist Spain was a "miserable wretch" because he did not denounce Churchill; Mrs. Roosevelt harbored secret ambitions for a fascist America. Every good act of the President arose from some horrible inner motive. Against the Labor Party and the government of Britain such a venomous offensive was directed that an Anglo-Soviet war upon Germany seemed far less logical than a Soviet-Nazi war upon Britain. Until within a few hours of Hitler's march on Russia, the Communists in all countries were trying to immobilize the anti-fascist workers by telling them that although Hitler was bad, Churchill and British labor were not a whit better.

Fortunately, the absurdities of the American Communists cannot and will not deceive the American people about the necessities of their own foreign policy. As we point out elsewhere, one can be strongly opposed to the Communists both here and in Russia and still recognize the fact that our own self-interest demands we should help the Russians resist Hitler to the maximum extent. The Communists will no doubt make another attempt now to set up a United Front; we doubt whether they will succeed with anybody whose memory is good enough to go back a couple of years. Yet after all, the whirling dervishes of New York or Moscow do not properly speak for the great masses of the Russian people. These have a right to defense against the invader, especially since it is certain that as an incidental part of that defense Russia's locked doors will be at least partially opened. In the meantime, one can safely ignore the absurdities of domestic comrades.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Gold Policy and Foreign Policy

FOR NEARLY A DOZEN YEARS the gold reserves of the United States have been increasing in geometrical progression at approximately five-year intervals. In 1929 they amounted to about $4,000,000,000; in 1934, chiefly as a consequence of devaluation, they reached $8,000,000,000; and in 1939 they passed $16,000,000,000. If imports of gold were to continue on the scale prevailing in 1939 and 1940, the figure of $32,000,000,000 would be reached by 1944. The fact that total recorded gold reserves of the entire world are less than $30,000,000,000 suggests that this is not likely to occur. If the inflow were to continue at the rate maintained last year, all the reported gold reserves of the world would be in this country in less than a year and a half. This also is a contingency that need not alarm us, since a large proportion of the gold still outside the United States is held in Germany or in countries subject to Germany, and cannot be regarded as entirely free to come to this country.

It follows from this that the gold problem as we have known it in recent years is about to change its character; indeed, it would probably be more accurate to say that the change has already taken place. The domestic and international implications of this change are of great importance to this country. The internal significance of the change arises primarily out of the effect of the sharp diminution, which is now manifest, in the rate of gold inflow.

The magnitude of gold imports in recent years is reflected in the growth of our gold stocks. At the end of 1940 the United States Treasury held gold reserves amounting to $22,000,000,000 and another $1,750,000,000 was under earmark for foreign central banks. This means that about 82 percent of the known gold reserves of the world were physically in this country and 76 percent were held by the Treasury.

The influx of gold has been the principal cause of the increase in reserves of member banks. Excess reserves—the amount above legal requirements—are the chief basis for present concern over inflation, as recent declarations of Federal Reserve authorities have emphasized. The slowing down of gold imports is certain to check the rate of growth of member-bank reserves and thereby to limit, though not to remove, the threat of inflation.

The certainty that the rate of gold imports will be smaller than in the past does not mean that the problem of gold inflow is nearing a solution. There is no prospect that the movement of gold to this country will be reversed, or will even stop. We can still, and quite possibly shall, continue to receive most of the gold currently being produced. But the time is not far distant when this is roughly all that is likely to come in. Even this would mean an extremely heavy inflow as judged by the standards of earlier years, but on the basis of recent gold movements it would appear moderate. Such a flow, undesirable as it might be, is not in the least incompatible with the new and more permanent phase of the gold problem upon which we are now entering. This phase, briefly, is "What shall the United States do after it has practically monopolized the available gold stocks of the world?"

The ugly fact that confronts us is the tremendous gap between the existing supply of gold, including current production, and any prospective need for it. Gold holdings today have a value as monetary reserves nearly three times their value in 1929; but in that year most of the world was on the gold standard and today no country except the United States even pretends to be. Moreover, the dollar value of new gold annually becoming available for monetary use is probably four times what it was during the twenties. Even if the gold standard were revived on as wide a scale as in 1929, the problem of excess gold would still exist.

As conservative an economist as Professor Sprague of Harvard finds himself obliged to assume that the United States will never get rid of its gold but will continue to hold, in perpetuity, gold stocks amounting to twenty-two to twenty-five billion dollars. He bases his hope that the gold standard may be restored after the war upon the possibility that the future output of gold may be taken by other countries, and in this way foreign gold reserves may be built up to a point where the distribution of gold holdings will eventually approximate the distribution that prevailed in 1929. But the condition of this fortunate outcome is that we resign ourselves to holding on to the bulk of our gold—apparently forever.

The full implications, domestically, of the changed character of the gold problem are necessarily clouded in doubt. But if it is impossible to draw definite conclusions for the longer term, it is no less difficult to draw comfort from the present outlook. In any event, the dwindling of gold imports, which have bulked so large as an item in our international accounts in recent years, is bound to produce important internal readjustments. But for the fact that all international economic relations are today so abnormal, these readjustments would be extremely disturbing. Under the circumstances, the impact of the change will probably not be fully felt until later.

From an international standpoint, the most important aspect of the gold problem in recent years has been primarily political in character. It turns on the part gold has played as an important quick asset in the hands of Britain and her allies. A glance at the figures

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of gold imports into the United States and the countries from which they came should convince anyone that the most important "aid-short-of-war" thus far rendered the British by this country has been through the purchase at a high fixed price of all gold that was offered. Nearly three-quarters of the gold imported in 1940 came from Canada and the United Kingdom, while their allies supplied most of the rest. In a very real sense, our gold policy has provided the material support for our foreign policy.

The reason our gold policy has had this partisan effect is that by far the greater part of foreign gold holdings were in the so-called democratic countries. Since September, 1939, the abandonment of our gold policy has been virtually precluded by the disastrous consequences such a step would have had upon the ability of Britain to carry on the war.

Changes resulting from the war have apparently reversed the position of England and the Axis with respect to relative gold stocks, and as a consequence this feature of the gold problem is now radically changed. The altered distribution of gold results from a decrease in allied holdings and an increase in the quantity under German control. British reserves of gold have been reduced through the sale of gold to pay for imports, while the addition to Germany's stocks is a result of her military conquests.

Contrary to general belief, the continental countries were not, in general, highly successful in moving their gold stocks abroad before they were invaded. There can be little doubt that the amount of gold now held by Germany and countries under the actual or practical domination of Germany is greater than the amount held by the British. This is true even when allowance is made for earmarked gold that has been frozen by order of the United States government. The substance of the matter is that gold, which originally was on the side of the Allies, now appears as a potential recruit to the Axis.

It is still true, however, that the outright abandonment of our gold-buying policy would be a serious blow to the British cause. Gold holdings of the British Empire are not entirely exhausted and are needed to pay for imports of food and war materials. Moreover, the annual production of gold within the Empire amounts to more than $700,000,000 and represents an important continuing resource. In any case, of course, the position of England as regards gold has changed for the worse. The great advantage the British derived from possessing gold was that its sale provided purchasing power without diverting man power or materials from war purposes, and without impairing the country's productive capacity. The dissipation of England's gold reserves largely explains the special need of our furnishing aid in the way of loans or gifts.

Under the circumstances, what seems to be called for is a discriminatory gold-buying policy which will enable England to sell gold freely in this market, while preventing Germany from disposing, directly or indirectly, of the gold under her control. It may seem that the blockade constitutes a sufficient obstacle to Germany's utilizing this gold or the balances into which it could be converted. While the blockade admittedly makes more difficult both the transfer of gold to this country and the receipt of goods or services in exchange, there are numerous ways in which Germany could employ gold to strengthen her position, and devious routes by which it could be brought to this country to be sold.

There is evidence that Germany has been using dollar assets to buy up obligations of that country now selling in the United States at a few cents on the dollar. A German-American financial house in New York recently circularized its German-speaking clientele, including refugees from the Nazi regime, advising them to buy German dollar obligations as a speculation. In this statement reference was made to the confiscation of gold in occupied countries. It was argued that this action had changed the gold situation in favor of Germany, thereby materially improving the prospects of these securities.

Even in the past, the benefits of our gold policy have not accrued solely to the democratic bloc. For a number of years, Japan has been selling gold to pay for necessary imports. In 1937 alone, Japan shipped $250,000,000 worth of gold to the United States. At the same time that our gold policy was helping to resist aggression in Europe, it materially aided the Japanese assault upon China. Our limited export embargo would be considerably more effective if we were to back it up with a refusal to accept gold from Japan. Any export embargo we may impose will limit Japanese purchases in this market only, whereas a refusal to provide dollar balances in exchange for their gold would restrict their ability to buy in any market. Failure to discriminate in this manner can only mean that our foreign policy is being sabotaged by our gold policy.

The means of implementing a discriminatory policy would not be hard to find. All the power needed is provided by the Gold Reserve Act, which gave the administration full authority to control gold and foreign-exchange operations. It would not be sufficient merely to refuse gold sent from particular countries, since this would invite evasion by shipment through a third country. Nor could we be sure of solving the problem by methods demanding proof of country of origin such as are customarily employed in the case of commodity imports. But it would be relatively simple, and legally unexceptionable, to put countries on a quota basis, limiting shipments to amounts sent in some earlier period. There is ample precedent, in this country and abroad, for the use of such a quota device. It could be handled in a way that would hold gold shipments from the Axis powers to a negligible amount, while leaving England free to send as much as she wished.

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At the same time it should satisfy those who are concerned to preserve the pretense of formal correctness in our policy toward other countries.

The possibility of discriminating as to sources from which we purchase gold is one that would clearly have to be faced in the event of a German victory. It seems inconceivable that we would continue to buy gold as at present if South Africa were to become part of the German Reich. Nevertheless, we might wish to keep on buying gold at the present price from domestic producers and possibly from producers in Canada.

The authorities in Washington are unquestionably aware of the problem presented by the changed distribution of gold, but there is nothing thus far to indicate whether they have done anything about it. Imports of gold from Japan have risen again, after ceasing for a time last summer, and fairly substantial quantities have been received by way of Portugal with no reduction in her reported reserves. On the other hand, the amount involved in these shipments has not been large; this may mean that the authorities in this country have already quietly intervened, or that the problem has not yet become acute.

The present administration has clearly demonstrated that it is both willing and able to act vigorously in supporting Britain against the dictatorships. No one would contend that our policy with respect to gold is likely to determine the outcome of that struggle, but its importance may be far more than incidental. The reversal in the position of England and Germany in regard to their command over gold is a grim reality that cannot safely be ignored. The government's task of invoking measures appropriate to the ends to which this country is committed will be rendered easier by a wide and realistic recognition of the changed character of the gold problem.

CHARLES R. WHITTLESEY

A British View of "Union Now"[1]

MR. CLARENCE STREIT, if not the only begetter of the Federal Union movement, is certainly its most persistent and persuasive advocate. His latest proposal is for "Union Now with Britain," as a means first of winning the war and thereafter of ensuring the peace. The nations of the British Commonwealth and the United States would enter into an immediate Federal Union. Each of them would surrender to a joint authority certain defined powers, including all those bearing upon war and peace. This joint authority, however—and this is the essential element of Mr. Streit's proposals—would not be a delegacy of the governments; it would be elected by the peoples. It would have a legislature of two houses, one elected on a population basis—that is, containing a majority of Americans—the other composed of representatives in equal numbers of the independent states entering into the compact—that is, with a British majority. There would also be a joint executive, elected by some means other than by vote of the legislature, and a Supreme Court appointed to act as guardian of the federal constitution. In brief, the proposal is that Britain and America should form a federation with a constitution of the American type. The resemblance, it is true, would not be absolute; the federation would have more restricted powers than the present American Union possesses, and there would be greater variety (for example, as between republicanism and monarchy) among the member states. But the two basic ideas of the Philadelphia Constitution would be faithfully reproduced: both the federal and the state governments would equally draw their powers from the people, neither therefore being able to displace the other from its appointed sphere; and within the federal government itself there would be a similar division of powers among legislature, executive and judiciary.

It will be difficult to set out the compelling reasons for believing that Mr. Streit's proposal is utterly impracticable, and that the degree of support it has won is more a cause for alarm than for gratification, without running some risk of giving offense in America. These reasons add up to the fact that a written constitution, a federal constitution, a constitution that enshrines the division of powers, would run flatly counter to all British experience and habits of thought, and might well leave this island in a more dangerous and exposed position than ever, as the outward limb of a paralyzed body, the prow of a rudderless ship. Americans, who are ready to debunk everything else, never criticize their Constitution, and the British view will be hard for them to understand. But the point must be made lest irreparable misunderstanding follow.

The fundamental principle of the American Constitution is that of checks and balances. It springs from a double distrust of government—first, of all government as tending to encroach on the rights of the individual; and secondly, of the federal government as tending to encroach on the rights of the states. Accordingly, a system was erected which puts the maximum of negative powers in the hands of minorities. The American Constitution was deliberately designed (it is hardly an exaggeration to say) to make it difficult for anybody to do anything. There is a premium on opposition (a clearer example could hardly be wanted than that which is under our eyes), and there are twenty

[1] For its interest to American readers, the following editorial article, in slightly condensed form, is reprinted from The Economist (London) of May 17.—THE EDITORS

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chances of saying No to every one of saying Yes. Moreover, the system makes true leadership difficult. In Great Britain, when the government decides on its policy, more than half the members of Parliament are pledged to expound and defend it in their speeches, in their writings, in all their contacts with the electorate. Popular consent is needed in Britain as in America, but here the dice are loaded in the government's favor, there in the opposition's.

It is not for an Englishman to express an opinion on the suitability of the American constitutional system for America's domestic needs. But when it is proposed to project the same system on to the international plane, and to apply it, not to a union of contiguous states with many more interests in common than at issue, but to two nations of very different structures and geographical positions—albeit with a common tradition and a common purpose—then the Englishman can legitimately raise his protest. The objection is not to the placing of limitations on the power of the government—still less of a joint British-American government; there can, and should, be such limitations—indeed, that is the difference between democracy and totalitarianism. There is also no insuperable objection to putting the limitations on paper—though the English tradition would rather trust in "that stern intractable sense of that which no man can stomach and still be free." But when the proper province of the state has been marked off, government must be free to act within it with decision, courage, consistency and forethought.

The task of democratic government is difficult enough in any case. Mr. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons this month, asked if it was realized

> how strong the negative principle is in the constitution and work of the British war-making machine. The difficulty is not to have more brakes put on the wheel. The difficulty is to get more impetus and force behind it. At one moment we are asked to emulate the Germans in their audacity and vigor and the next moment the Prime Minister is being assisted by being surrounded by a number of "No" men to resist him at every point and prevent him from making anything in the nature of a speedy, rapid and, above all, positive constructive decision.

If that is the present state of affairs under the British Constitution, which is both centralized and unitary—at a time, moreover, when the legislative powers of the government are unlimited—can it really be proposed that the great issues of state should be put in the hands of an authority which would be infinitely more inhibited by the negative principle? It is no answer to say that British governments do not always show foresight or courage. There is always the risk of Baldwinism—but the point is that a British government is not *prevented* from showing foresight or courage; within living memory there have been several governments that showed both qualities. But the past eight years have given an almost perfect example of the prohibitions that the American system of the division of powers imposes. Mr. Roosevelt has been a "stronger" President than any of his predecessors in modern times; there is no doubt that he has seen the crisis of civilization coming a long way off, or that he would have the courage to act decisively if it rested with him alone. But, for all that, America has met the crisis less prepared, materially and spiritually, than Baldwinian England; and she has not yet fully decided to act.

If the dilemma were posed of union on Mr. Streit's terms or no union at all, then the choice would indeed be a hard one. But there is no real reason to believe that this is the choice. A generation ago exactly the same false dilemma was posed among the British nations themselves. In the last war, the air was thick with plans of imperial federation and there were many who could see in this the only alternative to a steady drifting apart of the nations that had been drawn together in the comradeship of war. But it was not so. Paper schemes of federation were decisively and unanimously rejected. Indeed, it was not until the last tenuous bonds of obligation were deliberately snapped that the idea of Commonwealth reached its fulfilment—and we are seeing today that the unity is all the more real for being less formal. Britain can claim that her Commonwealth of Nations is the only union of fully free and wholly sovereign states that has ever worked in a crisis—and its constitution is a denial of all mutual obligations save only understanding and loyalty.

It is for these reasons that the order of ideas represented by Mr. Streit's book is to be deplored. It is not that the object is inacceptable—quite the contrary: there is nothing in public affairs more worth working and fighting for than the closest possible unity of the British and American states and peoples. It is not that, in the face of the need for unity, there would be any clinging to narrow national sovereignties for their own sake. It is because the method that Mr. Streit proposes would defeat his own object. His Federal Congress would merely add the certainty of constant bickering on small issues to the difficulties of securing common action on large. It would add the political maneuvers of one house against another, and of both against the executive, to the difficult enough task of mutual understanding. Rather than ensuring that both nations should act together, it would ensure for most of the time that neither could act at all.

What, then, is the road to unity, if this is a blind alley? It lies not through the grandiose planning of an Anglo-American Federation, but in the much more gradual and difficult creation of an Atlantic Commonwealth. Constitution-building, after all, is a delusion and a distraction. It concentrates thought on the machinery of politics, while all the time hard and continuous thought is needed on the policies themselves. This meeting of minds is not easy to secure, nor even the creation of conditions in which it is possible. One

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line of action, however, will certainly be beneficial—the fostering of the greatest possible interchange of personal contacts. There should be, after the war, a scheme of financial assistance, provided by the two governments, for any citizen of one nation who will visit the other, not as a tripper but as a serious student—the assistance might well take the form of very cheap ocean passages. There should be a doubling and redoubling of institutions such as the Rhodes Scholarships and the Commonwealth Fund Fellowships. As between the governments, too, there should be an effort to build up a continuous traffic of men and ideas. The ambassadorship in Washington should never again be held by any but a member of the Cabinet; and the precedent that is growing up in wartime, whereby nearly every British government department has one of its senior officials continuously in Washington (with an only slightly smaller concentration of American talent in London), should be faithfully followed in peacetime. By this means there would, in time, be no front-rank politician or leading civil servant in either country who had not had first-hand contact with the problems of the other.

What is required of the two nations is a full recognition of their fundamental unity of purpose, the establishment and maintenance of continuous mutual contact, the creation of confidence through knowledge and frankness, the instinctive assimilation of loyalties. These are difficult aims; but if they are achieved, formal constitutions will not be needed; and if they are not achieved, no paper document, however venerable, will bring agreement out of dissent.

The Boom Nobody Wanted

From the testimony at the first hearings of the Tolan Committee on national-defense migration, held at San Diego on June 12, it is apparent that the defense "boom" is causing the residents of the affected communities more anxiety than elation. Prior to 1940, San Diego was a slow-moving, rather indolent, residential community. Almost wholly lacking in industrial activity, local business was largely dependent upon expenditures made by the United States navy and by the large proportion of local residents who were retired middle-class families. The influx of these retired and semi-retired families had resulted in a fairly rapid population increase: from 148,000 in 1930 to 203,000 in 1940—an increase of 38 percent. Basing its plans upon past experience, the city anticipated a population in 1950 of about 250,000 and in 1960 of 300,000. But, in one year, the population has increased by at least 50,000 and another 50,000 will probably be added between now and the spring of 1942. Nor does this anticipated increase include the large growth in military personnel located in camps or stations near the city, and now estimated at about 40,000 men. In two years, therefore, the population will have grown more than was anticipated for the next two decades. The impact of this growth, wholly occasioned by the defense program, upon a community entirely unprepared, psychologically and otherwise, for rapid increase, has been highly convulsive.

To provide community facilities for the increased population, San Diego is faced with the problem of inducing the federal government to finance expenditures totaling approximately $21,000,000—for water facilities, $10,000,000; for new roads and highways (and the removal of wooden bridges), $7,000,000; for expanded school facilities, $3,877,500. It is quite obvious that most of this sum will have to come from the federal government in the form of outright grants or subsidies. Most of the new construction in San Diego, for housing and plant, is federally owned and is, therefore, tax-exempt. Since city and county revenue is derived almost exclusively from local property taxes, the tax base will not support levies for an amount sufficient to finance these new expenditures. While the increased population pays a considerable sum by way of sales tax, this revenue goes to the state and not to the local community. By charter provision, moreover, there is a definite limitation placed upon the amount of the levies that can be made by the city. All of the city's expenditures are budgeted; and no deficiency appropriations can be made. Already the city is rapidly approaching the total of the debt-limitation provision: the budget for the coming fiscal year is about $1,500,000 greater than for the current year. In November, 1940, a $4,300,000 bond issue was voted for additional water facilities and, in April, 1941, another totaling $1,983,000 for expanded sewer facilities. Both expenditures are already inadequate to meet increased needs.

When the "boom" started a year ago, the community was wholly unprepared to cope with the problem. The principal defense industry in San Diego is aircraft and the chief concern involved is the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation. The company was until recently a small industrial plant operated by a management that was, to put it mildly, fairly provincial in its point of view. Neither government nor industry was prepared for the stresses occasioned by the defense program. Unwilling to establish a local housing authority under the USHA, the city strenuously resisted the imperative demand for increased housing facilities. In partial explanation of this fact, it might be pointed out that almost everyone in San Diego is engaged in the real-estate business. As a result of this impasse, the

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government went in over the heads of the local officials and started the Kearney Mesa Housing Project (FWA), where some 3,000 units of family housing will shortly be completed, designed to accommodate 10,000 people.

From the point of view of construction, the project is a miracle of efficiency. Using mass-production methods, the contractor has erected whole streets of houses almost overnight. But, from a planning point of view, the project is a horrible example of what happens when the local community, its present and future needs, are not considered. The Kearney Mesa Project is served by one ten-inch pipe line for water; it is five miles from the nearest subcenter in the city; and it is served by two narrow-land highways. No other facilities are available. A new water line must be run to the property; a complete new sewer system must be installed; schools, libraries and recreational facilities must be provided; roads must be constructed; and local fire, police, hospital and garbage-collection services arranged. Jails are already overcrowded in San Diego and there is not a single bed available in the surgical ward of the County Hospital. Had the government housing program been broken up into five 600-unit projects, sites could have been found closer to the center of the city and to the industrial area where most of the community facilities were already available. In locating the Kearney Mesa Project, not a single local official or agency was consulted. Under the Lanham Act, contributions in lieu of taxes will be made to the city and county. It is estimated that these contributions will represent 15 percent of the shelter rent and will provide the city and county with a revenue of about $150,000 a year. But, if the property were privately owned, the revenue would be 60 percent greater. In any case, the contribution in lieu of taxes will be wholly inadequate to provide the customary community facilities to the project.

Since employment at Consolidated Aircraft Corporation has somewhat tapered off (about 16,000 are now employed), the housing shortage has been relieved. When the new plant which the government is building for Consolidated is completed, however, an additional 8,000 workers will be employed. Supplementing the Kearney Mesa Project, the navy itself has built two 600-unit housing projects; the FSA has constructed a trailer camp of 500 units (the FSA, by the way, has a record of complete coöperation with local officials); and the FWA has built some demountable houses and dormitories. At the present time, therefore, a total of about 7,928 additional units of government housing have been provided, greatly reducing the pressure for housing. With an estimated 4,000 units to be built by private enterprise in the next year, the housing problem in San Diego should be fairly well in hand. Rental listing agencies and the creation of a voluntary fair-rent commission should also help to relieve the situation. But rents, particularly in the middle brackets, are still high and a serious problem has arisen by reason of the fact that about 80 percent of the property owners refuse to rent to families with children.

Since Los Angeles is the major aircraft center in the United States, San Diego has not been able to recruit skilled workers in that area. As a consequence, only about 20 percent of the aircraft workers who have moved to San Diego are from other parts of Californit; 80 percent are interstate migrants. Workers have been recruited, primarily from the aircraft and vocational schools, from all over the country. Most of the migrants, however, are from the Middle West and the Rocky Mountain region. They have come, and are still coming, to San Diego by the thousand. Since only a relatively small number of them are employed (roughly a fourth of those who apply), and since local relief loads are not mounting, it would seem that many of them, arriving in San Diego with only limited funds and sensing the difficulty of obtaining jobs, soon decide to move on.

The case of Otis M. Porter, from Pawnee, Oklahoma, illustrates the problems faced by many of these interstate migrants. An electrician by trade, Porter came to San Diego in January, 1941, at the suggestion of a friend. He had $14 when he left Oklahoma and $7 when he arrived in San Diego. Having obtained employment at Consolidated, at 64 cents an hour, he sent for his family, consisting of a wife and six children. When the family arrived, Porter spent an entire day and most of a night trying to find a house that he could afford to rent. Unable to do so, he finally moved into a one-room cabin in an auto court, where the eight members of the family were residing at the time of the hearing. For these "accommodations," Porter pays $18 a week, or $72 a month. His monthly income is around $135. The case is somewhat exceptional because of the large number of children in the family, but it does indicate the problem faced by many recent migrants. John Russell Price, from Maryland, was formerly employed in the textile mills. Borrowing $15 from his mother-in-law, he set out for California with his wife and two children. Completely destitute when they arrived, they did manage to get some temporary relief (on a thirty-day basis), and moved into a trailer at a monthly rental of $18. After being in San Diego for about three weeks, Price, on the day of the hearings, had finally managed to get a job at 55 cents an hour. Cecil Goodin, a farm-hand, set out from Oklahoma for California on a freight. Typical of many latter-day migrants, Goodin is an "Aviation Okie," anxious to enter an aircraft school. After arriving in Bakersfield, he picked potatoes for a time and then drifted to San Diego. Everyone in Oklahoma, he testified, is talking about the aviation industry in California; it is just "news on the streets." These cases abundantly demonstrate the necessity for the continuance of the Tolan Committee and for prompt enactment of some of the recommendations which the committee has already submitted to Congress.

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Typical of the community attitude toward the "defense boom" was the testimony of Mr. Walter Bellon, chairman of the Board of Supervisors of San Diego County. Just prior to the 1929 depression, San Diego County was spending about $150,000 a year on its welfare program and had a reserve of about $500,000. When the depression came, the reserve was wiped out overnight and the county is still repaying sums borrowed from the state in 1934 to finance relief expenditures. "At the peak of present prosperity," according to Mr. Bellon, the county is spending about $5,749,000 a year on its welfare program—50 percent of the county budget. While most of this sum represents expenditures for the so-called categorical aids (blind, aged, needy children), nevertheless indigent aid, for the unemployables, amounts to $552,000 a year. Once again the county has a reserve of about $600,000, but, as Mr. Bellon pointed out, the present reserve would vanish in a matter of weeks if the defense program were even restricted, much less seriously curtailed. "Will the national defense program," he inquired of Mr. Tolan, "provide employment for those persons and their families who migrated from other parts of the states and from foreign countries when the emergency is over?" It is this spectre which robs the defense "boom" of all exhilaration for residents of San Diego who still remember the depression of 1929. Faced with an increased debt and taxing power strained to the limit (even assuming extensive federal grants-in-aid), San Diego residents realize that the real emergency will arise if and when the defense program begins to abate. Actually many of them fear the boom and would like to revert to a pre-1940 status.

Already the Tolan Committee, in the first of its hearings on defense migration, has begun to hear testimony on the necessity for providing a "cushion" against the time when the program is curtailed. Prompted by Mr. John Maynard Keynes, there is much talk of enforced savings to provide a fund against this future contingency. The word "compulsory" is skittishly avoided; but the idea, nevertheless, is quite apparent. The major difficulty in such a proposal, clearly illustrated at the San Diego hearings, is: just how can defense workers save? How can Otis M. Porter, with a wife and six children to support, earning $135 a month and spending $72 a month for rent, afford to pay even a portion of his salary into a special emergency fund? The national-defense program is rapidly cutting many communities all over the nation adrift from their established moorings. San Diego can never return, much as it should like to do so, to the indolent period in its history when it was a community for navy wives and "oldsters." In spite of itself, it has become a national defense "boom" town and its residents, thrilled by the expansion, are nevertheless uneasy. They stir, like sleepers disturbed by a nightmare, when they think of the "next emergency" or, as some of them already say, the "real emergency" which will arise in the future when the boom is over.

San Diego CAREY MCWILLIAMS

Why Japan Hesitates

THIS COMMENTATOR, setting out to discuss policy toward Japan from his English standpoint, is puzzled where to begin. One cannot debate the intentions of Japan in isolation. We are all playing in this ever widening struggle a complicated game of chess. It is useless to try to guess when and where your adversary's knight will jump, unless you are fairly sure what he means to do with his castles, his bishops and his queen. If we could be sure how the relationship of Hitler to Stalin will stand a month hence[1]; if we could be certain that the British, next fall, will be in secure possession of Syria, Irak, Egypt and the Suez Canal; if we could read the riddle of Germany's ability to invade the British Isles; if we were at ease over the Battle of the Atlantic—why, then, we might be able to guess the intentions of Japan.

Until these questions are answered by destiny, there is only one prediction I would risk: Mr. Matsuoka will continue to talk with great volubility, and he will contradict himself every other week. But as these questions are answered one by one, what must we expect? I will first risk a brusque reply and then try to justify it. I think that Japan will hesitate to commit herself irreparably to warlike action against the Western powers, unless and until Britain should suffer a grave reverse. Such a reverse might well be the loss of Suez. Even then, it is arguable that a firm stand by Washington might immobilize her.

No one doubts that Japan intends, when she can do it without excessive risk, to bring the Dutch East Indies and with them, if possible, Burma and Malaya, within her Empire of Prosperity. All of us perceive that if she could acquire the raw materials of these regions, it would be difficult to set a limit to her further expansion within the next decade. Why, then, did she take no decisive action this time last year, when so many factors of her military problem were in her favor? France was stricken down; Britain had to concentrate all her forces on the defense of her own island; Singapore was weakly held, and American opinion was not yet where it is today. In fact, the party of action did strengthen its grip on the rudder in Tokyo; it did expand the Axis to a

[1] Mr. Brailsford's article was written before the Russo-German war began. — THE EDITORS

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Triple Alliance; but all it ventured to do was to carry out a partial occupation and total humiliation of French Indo-China. This, doubtless, enhanced the prestige of Japan, won gratitude from the rather simple people of Thailand, and obtained some valuable bases for aerial and amphibean operations. For a party of action, equipped with robust appetites and elastic principles, this was a small use to make of a unique opportunity.

Why, then, did the Japanese behave with so much caution a year ago? First, the Chinese incident still occupied the main body of their land forces. Second, they feared that Stalin would strike in the north, if they involved themselves too recklessly in the south. As everyone knows, the Japanese have never sent their best first-line troops into China; their shock troops of the younger classes, the most highly trained and the best equipped, they have kept in Manchuria to face the Russians. We may assume that they cannot, after the reinforcement of Singapore, risk a major operation in the south, until they feel sufficiently confident of Russian friendship, or of Russia's preoccupation, to withdraw their best troops from the north and use them in the south.

If these were their only reasons for hesitation, it may be said that the outlook from the Japanese standpoint is now in one respect improved, but only in one. China is still resolutely belligerent, and while the attitude of her Communist armies may cause anxiety, she now enjoys, as she did not a year ago, the open support of both the Western powers. Singapore is now strongly held by land, sea and air; even Hong Kong can now be defended. But in a pact of friendly neutrality, Mr. Stalin and Mr. Matsuoka have discovered that they are brother Asiatics. They are now on the point of concluding a trade agreement. There may possibly have been secret clauses in the Moscow pact which account for the rather emotional satisfaction of the Japanese.

But among English students of the Far East yet another reason is accepted as the explanation of Japan's hesitation, and this reason is as valid now as it was a year ago. Under all their bluff, the Japanese are very far from feeling sure of their own military power. Their victories on land and sea over Tsarist Russia were won during the decay of an always corrupt and inefficient system. Their navy has never measured itself against the West; their air force is thought to be third-rate. By their own admission, when their best troops met the Red Army in Mongolia, they were outclassed on land and in the air. If this interpretation is correct, it is easier to understand the caution in action that corrects the bluster and the boasting. The Japanese may feel their way and test us with pin-pricks, but they will not attack Singapore and the Dutch islands unless they believe that the British Empire is about to collapse; even then, determined American action could probably stop them. The crisis, on this reading, will come only after such a dire and, let us hope, unlikely event as the evacuation by Britain of the Mediterranean and Suez.

Like every political problem, this question of Far Eastern policy turns out to be largely psychological. Against an unsure adversary the one fatal tactic is appeasement and weakness. The British, conscious of their temporary weakness in these waters, tried it for several years under the guidance of Ambassadors Lindley and Craigie. They suffered insult and injury at Tientsin with evangelical patience. Against all their interests and instincts they closed the Burma Road to the injury of China—happily only for three months. It is an open secret that from the Tokyo Embassy came the confident prediction that Japan would enter the war against them unless they closed it. Public opinion insisted on its reopening and nothing disastrous—nothing even unpleasant—happened. That lesson has left its mark on British thinking.

The ideal course is to strengthen the outposts to the utmost of one's ability, and for the rest, while avoiding provocation, to behave with fearless serenity, even when one sees the risks. Most Englishmen now deplore the weakness of the Chamberlain ministry in its dealings with Japan and blame it for its failure to concert betimes a common policy with Washington. If I may venture, as a free-lance, to suggest a course of action now, it would run thus:

1. To increase from the U.S.A. and from India, even with some little stinting of our own prior needs, our material help to the Chinese, whom we should frankly recognize as allies.

2. To leave no shadow of doubt in the minds of the Japanese that an attack on the Dutch islands will instantly bring both our fleets into action.

3. To put an end, albeit with courtesy, to the export of all warlike supplies to Japan.

There are risks in such a policy, for the game on this chessboard is hard to read. But all British experience, whether with Germany, Italy or Japan, has taught us that the riskiest course of all is to appease and strengthen a professional aggressor. That is to earn his contempt and hasten his attack.

New York City H. N. BRAILSFORD

Poem

Soldier, at the closing door
Stare no more,
For the half-glimpsed room that glowed
Is no kinder than the road.

Soldier, think the brightness there
Was the glare
That the stoker feeds, and fast
Slams the door upon the beast.

Love and Hunger may as well
Fuel hell.
Soldier, on! And thank your stars
You are bound for simpler wars.

SYLVIA TOWNSEND WARNER

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Washington Notes

Orders to Shoot

THE PATTERN OF President Roosevelt's war policy becomes clearer every day. The shooting may have started by the time this is printed; it may not start for a long time to come. When it does come there will be no reason for anyone to inquire what the shooting is about. It will be about piracy on the high seas. The President's message to Congress on the Robin Moor affair was chiefly intended to explain in advance of any shooting incident what the administration's attitude would be. It left slight leeway for doubt that commanders of the one hundred-odd American fighting ships plying the North Atlantic now have orders to shoot at any marauding German U-boat or surface raider that gives them provocation. In all probability, an attack on a British merchantman within sight of an American patrol boat would be considered sufficient provocation.

To fight pirate craft like the still unidentified U-boat that sank the Robin Moor would not require a declaration of war or any other form of congressional sanction. A reminder that he has, as commander of the navy, full authority to proceed against pirates, identified or unidentified, without specific approval from Congress was implicit in the President's message. He asked for no authorization —merely explained what he was doing. Since his plan of naval warfare by-passes Congress, he probably will be meticulous about keeping the legislative branch informed of every move.

The United States navy is now patrolling a ship lane that extends far into the Atlantic. It uses both ships and planes, and enough of them to make the lane unsafe for interlopers. At the lane's eastern end, meanwhile, the British are cutting down shipping losses by a more extensive use of Consolidated flying boats made in the U. S. A. Greenland apparently has become a base of operation for the patrol and Iceland may soon become another. Improvised aircraft carriers—merchantmen fitted out with flight decks —are being added to the Atlantic fleet.

On the diplomatic front, too, the President is on the offensive. By kicking out the German consuls, he got rid of the high command of the Nazi espionage system. By freezing German assets in this country, forbidding further immigration of Germans with relatives back home and prohibiting emigration of Germans now here, he put a further crimp in the Nazi organization which has been using the proceeds of Germany's American royalties and investments to finance propaganda activities both in the United States and in the Latin Americas.

All this has been done without changing this country's status as a technical neutral. If Hitler wants to get out of the pirate-chased-by-neutral corner into which he has been pushed, he must take the initiative and declare war. But if he did this, the isolationists who play his game in Congress wouldn't have a leg to stand on. As matters are now, they might prevent a declaration of war on Germany by chatter and filibuster, if not by persuasion, but they would have no chance if Hitler declared war first.

In response to the State Department's protest against the sinking of the Robin Moor, the Germans said, in effect: "We didn't do it but if we did we intend to go right on doing the same thing." The President could scarcely have found better justification for his sea-patrol policy had he himself been handling the Berlin end of the exchange.

Secretary of the Interior Ickes, acting in the capacity of oil conservator, lost no time in forcing a showdown on the State Department's policy of Japanese appeasement. Announcing that a shortage of transport facilities would soon cut oil supplies below demand on the Eastern seaboard, he forbade shipment of a cargo of fuel oil from Philadelphia to Japan. Moreover, he made it plain that all future cargoes would likewise be denied permits.

Thus he clamped down a *de-facto* embargo at Eastern ports and State Department officials, fume and sputter as they might, had no choice but to make it *de jure*.

Oil is, of course, still moving from Western ports to the Japanese, but this may not last very long either. If a serious oil shortage develops, as it almost inevitably will, and Secretary Ickes starts rationing gasoline for pleasure cars, the State Department will find it almost impossible to justify exports to Japan in the eyes of the motoring public.

So, in the end, the hotly debated question of Japanese oil supply may be resolved by public opinion and considerations of morale at home rather than by considerations of high policy abroad. The disagreement is the same as it always has been. Some administration officials want to give Japan enough oil to discourage invasion of the Dutch East Indies; others are ready for a complete stoppage, even at the risk of fighting in two oceans simultaneously. Basically, it is a question of military and naval strategy, and part of the disagreement is over questions of fact, like the size of Japan's present oil reserves and the efficiency of her navy.

Philip Murray, the unhappy chief of the CIO, emerged from John L. Lewis' office last week looking even glummer than usual. Presently he issued a statement deploring talk of a Red purge. Just what had gone on in Lewis' office, no one except the two men who had participated in the conference knew. Obviously Lewis had turned on the heat. The best guess seemed to be that he had threatened to pull his miners out of the CIO if Murray molested the Communist union leaders who are now Lewis' principal allies in the organization. Lewis might have pointed out also that Murray himself is on the United Mine Workers' payroll. Lewis is not reticent in these matters, as he demonstrated in his campaign speech for Willkie. However it was extorted, Murray's statement nipped the purge.

At the same time, a group of young administration liberals started a campaign to undo much of what was done in the heat of the North American aviation battle. They suggested creation of a National Labor Policy Board, with labor itself comprising half the membership, to stand off the menacing anti-labor bloc in Congress. At a conference attended both by Murray and William Green, it was decided that the AFL and the CIO would coöperate in fighting the Vinson bill and other pending anti-labor measures. It seems probable that a compromise between labor and its harshest congressional critics will evolve.

Washington T. R. B.

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Behind the Camera: Lang

IN HOLLYWOOD, as I guess anywhere else, it is not enough to be just a director: you must be a smart director. Making movies is such an expensive business that you have to get signed up with a studio to make them in, negotiate some kind of backing and tie-up, and learn enough of production cost to keep within reasonable budget requirements. You can't sit around waiting for a story you like to come and curl up in your lap; you can't go bang into your work without considering the attitude to the work of dozens of others engaged on it, writers, actors, technicians. Above everything you must consider your own standing and what things will make or break it, for this prestige is your main bargaining point, and it is with this you will be able to get your way when necessary. And for a while in Hollywood it looked as though Fritz Lang were not being smart.

He came over with a full-grown European reputation seven years ago. He had just completed "Liliom" abroad and it was a pretty awful picture, but it got a lot of solemn attention because the director of "M," "Metropolis," "Mabuse," etc., had made it. I don't know the exact details on the first years in Hollywood, and they probably weren't important, but they built up a general picture of Fritz Lang that it was not good for a director to have. He was a Prussian with a monocle; he treated his actors like a Prussian with a monocle, and he had tantrums; he would fuss around until he had run up a month's expense for a week of actual footage; he only wanted to make what he wanted to make and what *had* he made? The picture "M" can still be seen, but did he think he could live on that forever? He had as a matter of fact made "Fury" (1936), with some of the most terrific stuff ever in pictures; but in around three years following he had completed two weak films, and the word was out. However that may have been, you will not find traces of it today: the man is making pictures, in what seems to be the right way.

Fritz Lang is a fairly heavy-set man with a prominent nose, quick, boring eyes, hair just on the edge of bushy and receding only a little, brushed straight back, and a toed-out walk that would be a shuffle if it were not so nervous and purposeful. He is fifty-one and looks a good forty. Probably the first noticeable thing is the accent in the speech, but while this is prominent, it is no heavy thing of kraut, as he has assimilated English in its best racy forms, is voluble, at ease in the colloquial, sometimes barbed and sometimes profane. He makes also with jokes and puns and will chuckle when you tell him they stink, which sometimes they don't. This is about as true of him when he is hopping and fussing around the set as when he is on his couch at the office, which always has the windows closed through some theory of his that fresh air will be the death of somebody yet. Or when he is relaxing in New York and has the monocle on, *i. e.*, times of a social nature (the monocle is made of plate glass and gives him the effect of a wall eye in a waxworks, which might be terrifying to some and thus have contributed to the legend). He is one of the few men who can concentrate furiously and then leave it alone—as, for example, when he is doing a mob scene with extras, storming in and out and around them and the actors and the grips and generally killing himself over some main point of action, and comes over between takes to sit down: "There. Now what is about this God-damn Hitler in Greece, eh?"

He is a careful, careful man, which means that scenes will be done over until they are right, until they are the way he saw them back when he was working on the story and working out diagrams for it. But he works while others are resting and then when they are working he is right there within two feet of their nose, working with them, coaching and coaxing and explaining even as the cameras are taking it (that part of the sound track has to be cut out: they must love him in the recording room). And he doesn't delegate the handling of groups to an assistant but does the running himself—which is one way and about the only way to get such mob-violence scenes as he got in "Fury," if you don't weaken. And one afternoon I saw him, washing up a subway chase sequence in the last picture, when one of the crew had dumped a heavy candy-purveyor onto his foot, breaking two toes. He took it, he didn't even grouse, and the rest of the afternoon he did his hobbling and hopping up and down the set with a cane, a rough bandage and an old slipper on that foot, bent over but getting his scenes in like hay before the rain and making a fine spectacle for the others, who said he was now even walking with a thick accent (he really looked something like the crochety passion of the doctor in "Caligari"), and still all he said when he came to sit down during a new set-up and feel his toes speculatively was, "Now, you tell me: what are you going to do with the damn critics?" The legend of the terrible Prussian was not to be found on that set.

He is a strange man from any angle. Born in Vienna, educated at the Realschule there, first studying to be an architect, later studying painting in Munich and Paris. He went into the war as an Austrian officer. His record was three wounds and four decorations, but his stories are better. That poor old Austrian army of ours, he says, chuckling to think they were nearly as bad as the Italians. Many things they did and didn't do, but in the mellow distance, a thing that makes the best telling is one like the time the Austrians were in some holding position and so short of ammunition that they only fired three salvos from every other battery at nine every morning, to keep the franchise. It was all very peaceful until the Italians angered them by hanging out an impudent and enormous sign: Tomorrow, Tuesday, 24, please fire three salvos 10:15, not 9. They passed the word all around the batteries and got up all the advance ammunition for the week on every battery, and waited until 10:15 and blew the roof completely off with an all-out barrage. They really meant it. When all the advance ammunition was gone and they'd pulled the cotton out of their ears, they looked over to see the devastation, and were naturally a little slow in getting the sign, rising, neatly lettered, over the front-line trenches. The Italians had meant it too: they were in for an inspection from the commanding colonel and had plotted him for front-line position some time between ten and ten-thirty. And the new sign read: "Thanks, friends; colonel critical, maybe dead."

But those years were not so happy in their day-to-day passage, or the years afterwards. Fritz Lang has been in several revolutions, always on the side of the new order until the new order meant the Hitler idea. Four revolutions, he says, but it was in between and around revolutions that he became the man you have heard of. There will be time for more of this part later.

OTIS FERGUSON

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Records: Not for Hot Weather

In the two new recordings of the Eroica now on the market you have a straight choice between something very intense and Latin and something expansively German. Victor has recorded one of last year's Beethoven cycle broadcasts by Toscanini and the NBC Orchestra (M-765; $7), which is to say it's recorded something of a crusade with Toscanini out in front whipping the others on with all the dogma of a hard-bitten Calvinist, though I must say there is something magnetic in this incorruptible fanaticism of his on the subject of Beethoven, something that gives extraordinary drive and impact to all his performances of the Eroica. You won't hear him singing along with the music here, but it is the Maestro in his top style.

Walter's recording with the New York Philharmonic (Columbia M-449; $6.50) is more philosophical, but sound and strong even when compared with Toscanini's. Walter advances stolidly along broad lines, and it's second nature with him to hold himself in, building a reserve of power which wisely he will never touch, though you always know it's there. His doubling of the hunting horns in the Scherzo turns out to have been a bad bet, and his violins are not so clean and sharp as Toscanini's, but still the sound of the Philharmonic on these records is as superior to that of the NBC Orchestra as Carnegie Hall is to Studio 8H on Rockefeller Plaza.

I don't like to talk about Studio 8H year in and out, but to get an idea of what Toscanini can make his NBC men sound like in the proper setting, listen to the recording of the Brahms B Flat Piano Concerto he made with Horowitz in Carnegie Hall (Victor 740; $6.50). This fine album, incidentally, is only one set in a series which is developing into a minor Brahms boom. Columbia is now releasing an album of twelve Brahms *Lieder* sung with warm intimacy and grace by Lotte Lehmann (M-453; $4), who proves here (but not only here) that she has one of the great voices of our time, and discretion enough to know what not to do with it. The quality of these songs is somewhat uneven, but with more good than indifferent, and it makes a more interesting album, on the whole, than Brahms's second Serenade for Orchestra, even though this piece happens to be played quite well by some alumni of the National Orchestral Association under Korn (Victor M-774; $4).

Both the Third and Fourth Symphonies of Brahms are now on the market with two versions each. Stock and the Chicago Orchestra have done an honest, creditable job with the Third for Columbia (M-443; $4.50), which is, as you might expect, very German, pleasantly stout and beery with a heavy list toward trombones, horns, drums, the lower woodwinds and strings, though with not much in the way of tone or phrasing in the high woodwinds or first violins. Kindler and the National Symphony go about it more briskly (Victor M-762; $4.50) and despite a little confusion in the lead parts come through with a sensitivity and restraint surprising to anyone who has not heard them since last year.

When Victor handed Brahms's Fourth over to Koussevitsky, last year, it had been played in the same way so often and for so long that it seemed a sure case for the oxygen tent. But what Koussevitsky has come up with is something new and fresh and as alive as the ballet girls on the cover of the album (M-730; $5). It's partly the recording—clear enough so you can visualize the seating plan way back to the triangle that dances merrily into the third movement—but more that subtle Gallic style and tone of the Boston Symphony. In the last movement, where there is a monotony of key and rhythm which begins to ring with the hollow sound of a loose drum after repeated playings in the traditional style, Koussevitsky has altered the tempos and heightened the colors, and brought to it much more than he took away, though he must have known what the purists would have to say about *that*.

Stokowski has also recorded the Brahms Fourth quite recently and in his familiarly unorthodox style (Columbia M-452; $6.50). Having made his last appearance with the Philadelphia Orchestra (and it will probably stick this time because there will be a lot of busy lawyers if it doesn't), all his recording work is now being done with Columbia and his new pet, the National Youth Orchestra. Thanks chiefly to Columbia's technical men, its current records show a great improvement over those of last summer. The orchestra itself has only improved slightly. In Brahms's Fourth, in Beethoven's Fifth (M-451; $5.50) and in a special arrangement of what he calls the Love Music from "Tristan and Isolde" (M-427; $3.50), his Youths show strong traces of what is now famous as the Philadelphia tone and mannerisms (pipe-organ wind effects, for example, silky violins and somewhat muffled horns), and I have nothing against that but the feeling that he is asking too much of them—that they can't negotiate the wide range of the dynamics he insists upon and can't meet many of his demands without severe strain and a conscious striving for effect. Still, I like what he does with the Fate motive of the Fifth, and the beginning of its third movement, a number of parts of the Brahms; and with "Tristan" the music flows quite easily, even though lacking the magnificent dark coloring he could splash around with the Philadelphia Orchestra.

Something a little more seasonal is Debussy's Afternoon of a Faun, more hazy and shimmering and drowsier than ever as Stokowski has redone it with the Phillies (Victor 17700; $1), but Benny Goodman and the Philharmonic play his first Clarinet Rhapsody just as fluently (Columbia 11517; $1) and it is a little fresher. One of the most charming single records of the year so far is a ten-inch affair on which Guimar Novaes tinkles through two little sonatas of Domenico Scarlatti in her clean-cut effortless way, and adds Couperin's La Tendre Nanette and Daquin's L'Hirondelle for good measure (Columbia, 17229-D; 75 cents). And for such a cool lucid player as Gieseking, Chopin's Barcarolle in F Sharp Minor (Columbia 71026-D; $1) is no trouble at all. What Barlow has done with Three Dances from Smetana's Bartered Bride and the CBS Symphony (Columbia 71049-D; $1) will do if you fiddle around with the tone control and cut out a few overtones, and quite well at that, but Columbia has done a better recording job in the waltzes Richard Strauss wrote for Rosenkavalier (11542-D; $1), and watch this Rodzinski, who does them with the Cleveland Orchestra; he's still on his way up.

STANLEY FERGUSON

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A Communication

Defense of the Hemisphere

SIR: I want to express my appreciation to Malcolm Cowley and to The New Republic for the lengthy and comprehensive review of my book, "United We Stand!" [May 26]. I was particularly impressed by the review because of Mr. Cowley's obvious sincerity and because, too, he gave me credit for the sincerity of my point of view—something which is only too rare in the divided America of 1941. It is, I think, one of the most unfortunate manifestations of our day that the schism in this country is now so wide that citizens who express what may be an unpopular or minority point of view are too often identified as "Fifth Columnists," "Nazis," etc. I, therefore, all the more appreciated the temperance and sanity of his criticism and his recognition of my sincerity.

But I must take exception to one or two of his points, for I do not feel that these points correctly represented the book, or my ideas.

1. I plead guilty to "a lack of political training," at least in so far as academic training is concerned. As I pointed out in my book, the curriculum at the Naval Academy unfortunately does not include the political sciences and I have been trying ever since to compensate for this lack. I feel, however, that I have gained some rough-and-ready political knowledge in a more practical school—the school of the newspaper, and I assert that my political realism, no matter how distasteful to preconceived notions, represents a greater degree of sanity than so much of the political—and military—wishful thinking that is prevalent today.

2. My reference to the size of the army the United States needs was based on a hemispheric-defense policy. I specifically stated that if we were to fight in Europe, we would require, not an army of hundreds of thousands, but perhaps of millions. Moreover, it seems to me that Mr. Cowley, in common with many, confuses the issue when the question of military man power is discussed. Whether we fight in Europe, in Asia or in South America, man power is an all-important factor in the equation of victory, and conservation of man power and *its most efficient use* fundamental to victory. We can well defeat our own end—victory—if we conscript millions, taking them away from the factory, the navy, the air force. (Yet we are doing that today; the navy—and many factories—are already suffering from lack of man power. And *vide* England, where many critics deplore the present 100-division goal as positively *destructive* to a successful war effort.)

3. The retention of most of our long-range bombers in this country would by no means "delay or render impossible a British victory." I specifically suggested that most of our other types, especially medium bombers, be sent to Britain, and for Britain's purposes medium bombers are excellent implements. Moreover, anyone who now thinks that Britain can be "saved" or Germany defeated by so minor a measure as the sending of long-range bombers obviously has not judged the war situation correctly. Germany is beyond defeat (particularly if she gets the Eastern Mediterranean) unless this country goes into a shooting war on an unlimited basis almost immediately. Long-range bombers are by no means enough; neither are convoys; only the greatest effort this country has ever made will suffice now to ensure victory. And even so, the price will be great. But it can be done; nothing is beyond our capacity, if we act quickly enough.

4. Mr. Cowley is obviously far more confident in his forecasts of the future than I am when he states flatly that if Britain is defeated we shall have no choice except a two-ocean war. He may be right, but in any case I think he missed my point. I was trying to say that if we do fight against Germany, war with Japan is not necessarily inevitable if we take the right steps. And by right steps I don't mean appeasement, but the steps specifically advocated in my book, which are based upon force—the only understandable language in this world of power politics.

5. His final point seems to me to be less in accord with my meaning than any of the preceding which I have thus summarily disposed of. He says that the policy I advocate is "chiefly defensive, a policy of assuming limited liabilities and waiting to be attacked." It seems to me rather difficult to apply such language to any policy such as that I have advocated (and still advocate—for hemisphere defense *is* vital, whether or not we go into the war). For hemisphere defense is certainly so huge a concept that a more valid criticism of such a policy might be, not that it was a *defensive* one, not that it was a policy of *limited liability*, but that it offered such tremendous problems that it might require the overextension of our strength and might not be militarily, politically and economically practical. I feel that it is practical, but I feel that it is a policy which would try our strength and require *aggressive* strategy and *aggressive* tactics to implement properly.

It is far better to judge our capacity before the event than to weep bitter tears after it, and I believe that most military observers will tell you that it will be far more practical to defend South America and our own vital interests from a base on the shoulder of Brazil (and/or in the Cape Verde Islands) than from a base at Dakar. For, given modern air power, one cannot hold Dakar alone, one must hold all of West Africa to ensure the safety of Dakar.

Finally, I did mention the political and economic arguments against hemisphere defense in my book and did discuss them briefly, although "United We Stand!" was intended primarily as a military study. I must leave these latter studies to more erudite academicians, for I make no pretense to the cap and gown.

More seriously, may I just note this addendum: that my book was completed in January before the lease-lend bill was passed and that much water has gone over the dam since then. Obviously we have today reached a compelling crisis, which the President's recent speech has not resolved by action. In a most uncertain world I am certain only of one thing: that if we are to act at all we must act quickly; the margin of time is no longer represented by months but only by days and weeks.

New York City HANSON W. BALDWIN

SIR: I was very glad to read Mr. Baldwin's letter, partly because of my great respect for him as a military analyst and a man who speaks his mind; partly because it indicates

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a considerable alteration in his thinking. Let me try to answer his five points in order.

1. The best proof that his military judgment was better than his political judgment is the book itself, considered in the light of recent events. "United We Stand!" was finished in January, but its comments on the army, the navy and the air force are even more valuable today than when they were written. The only changes necessary to bring them up to date would be in the case of a few criticisms that the military authorities have been trying hard to meet. On the other hand, Mr. Baldwin's political discussions—as he says himself—have been largely invalidated by the passage of the lease-lend bill. And my point would be that the lease-lend bill was not a wholly unexpected development, but rather a natural development out of what had gone before. Men of great political experience had been saying for months that the United States was really at war with Germany, that Hitler regarded this country as an adversary to be defeated, and that we had to support Britain by any means within our power. They were proved right by events; Mr. Baldwin was wrong.

2. It was not his statement about the *size* of the American army that I was criticizing. Half a million men might conceivably be enough, if they were superior in training and equipment to any other army in the world. In any case, the question of size is one to be decided by the Conmmander-in-Chief, on the advice of the General Staff. My point was that an army capable of defeating Germany would not be "a business man's army, stable as to numbers and budget." To depend on a business man's army in the present war would be like depending on Hannibal's elephants.

3. Britain needs medium bombers; she needs everything we can give her. But now that so many of the German war industries have been moved far to the east, where only the biggest planes can reach them, she needs long-range heavy bombers more than anything else in the world, except ships. If we kept all our long-range bombers at home, we might soon have to use them at home.

4. I attached two "ifs" to my prophecy of war in two oceans—*if* Britain is defeated and *if* Japan remains faithful to the Axis. It is the job of American diplomacy, American productive power and our armed forces to see that neither of these events takes place.

5. In the war with Germany in which we are now engaged—and have been engaged since the fall of France—defense of this hemisphere has become an obsolete conception. The war is already being fought by economic and political means in all parts of the world. When this country begins to fight it by military means as well, South America will be only one of the potential battlefields. South America would be hard to defend without the islands off the African coast (especially the Cape Verdes) and these in turn would be impossible to defend without command of the sea. The ultimate fate of both the Americas may be decided by a naval battle in the North Atlantic or even the Sea of Japan. There are no limited or defensive solutions to the conflict.

Mr. Baldwin is absolutely right when he says in his letter (which on this point sounds very different from his book) that "only the greatest effort this country has ever made will suffice now to ensure victory." And he is right when he says, "But it can be done; nothing is beyond our capacity, if we act quickly enough." – M. C.

The Bandwagon

Axis quarters in Ankara said that Germany could be sure of "considerable popular support" in the occupied countries for an attack on Russia because the occupied states would rather enter into a venture against the Soviet than starve. – *Dispatch by C. L. Sulzberger from Ankara to The New York Times.*

Half-postage seems to me not only discourteous, as it has ever been to the friends to whom cards are sent; but at present, with the need on every hand for funds, there is danger in this postage-saving of seeming to flaunt self-sacrifice, even, in fact, to give the impression of having nothing left but the fraction of a cent. – *Emily Post in the Sunday magazine section of The New York Herald Tribune.*

Rest Cure

More and more the city moves itself and its pieces under the rocks. Offices, radio stations and university classes function underground, and many shelters boast such luxuries as table-tennis equipment, small gardens near the entrances where people can relax in the sun while waiting for raids. – *Article on Chungking in Life Magazine.*

God-Bless-America Department

If you lack courage and imagination, better get a job with the government or enlist in the army as soon as possible. – *From an article by Roger W. Babson in The Pasadena Post.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Intelligence in Crisis

SIR: I want to put myself on record as supporting the view expressed by Bruce Bliven in "Still a Pacifist" in the April 21 issue of The New Republic: " . . . if we find it necessary to convoy merchant ships to ensure their safe passage, we should convoy them; if going to war is the only alternative to a world dominated by fascism, we should go to war. For there is one thing, and only one, that is worse than war itself: slavery."

I believe that the mass of Americans, as revealed in many Gallup polls, are basically inconsistent in their outlook toward the present world war. On the one hand they say: "We want England to defeat Hitler and we are willing to supply her with all the materials necessary to achieve this end." On the other hand they also say: "We will not fire a single shot in this war unless our shores are attacked." If we had been logical in our thinking, once we had taken the position that *Hitler must be defeated*, everything that was done in the way of giving aid to the Allies would have been determined solely in terms of strategy.

It ought to be made clear to our people *now* that their freedom of action has been hampered by a blind adherence to a dogma: "Never again; we sent troops across the Atlantic once, then look what happened."

If our basic purpose is that of protecting that aspect or quality of living that we call the democratic, and if Hitlerism or fascism —wherever it is found—is seen as an uncompromising enemy of democracy, then it should follow that whatever we do by way of participation in this world war ought to be aimed deliberately

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at defeating the Axis coalition in the shortest time possible. If convoys are needed, then we should send them; if pilots as well as airplanes are needed, they should be sent; if, later, good strategy calls for sending troops, this should be done. Certainly, we should put ourselves on an all-out, wartime basis; crucial industries should be operating on a twenty-four-hour-a-day basis; all available man-power should be put to work in subsidiary activities; technical training in our schools and colleges ought to be expanded greatly; a nationwide health program should be instituted to the end that every man, woman and child has adequate food and medical care; positive attention should be given to such matters as recreation, conservation of our natural resources, effective spending of salaries and wages, and the like.

On the negative side, steps ought to be taken at once to ensure that no one profits out of this war. We need a thoroughgoing financial policy consistent with a program that involves risking the lives of our young men. As I see it, this calls for (1) a greater use of the graduated income tax, by both broadening the base and increasing the rates in the upper brackets, (2) both reducing the profits that any industry may make and increasing the excess and undivided-profits taxes; and (3) perhaps the taxing of various forms of savings. An "all-out" policy is *all-out* and not business-as-usual.

McKinley High School MILES E. CAREY, Principal
Honolulu, Hawaii

McMahon to Aiken

SIR: I do not find General Aiken's reply, in your issue of June 23, to my open letter to Mr. de Valera, published in your issue of May 12, very satisfactory. The two most important points of disagreement between us concern the issues at stake in the present struggle, and the strategic importance of the Irish bases.

I wish the General had been a little more explicit on the nature of the present war. He assures us that the Irish people examined carefully the question, weighing the war aims, deeds, etc., of both belligerents, and then decided on a policy of neutrality. We are left to infer that the cause of England for them is not the cause of all humanity.

Just what is at stake in the struggle, I should like to ask the General? Will he disagree with Hitler, who has proclaimed that this is a war between two worlds, and with Mussolini, who recently said the same thing? Is he prepared to tell the Poles, the Czechs, the Danes, the Norwegians and the other oppressed peoples that two fundamentally different ways of life are *not* involved in the current conflict?

President Roosevelt has proclaimed the "four freedoms" for mankind as the American objective in the event that Nazism is destroyed. Anthony Eden, speaking for England, has endorsed this objective. No one in his senses, of course, believes that the victory of the democracies will mean a heaven-on-earth for all peoples. But their victory will mean there is a serious chance for the amelioration of the lot of humanity, provided the requisite good will and intelligence are exercised in the post-war period. Their victory will mean, at the very least, the destruction of the most deadly and the most powerful foe of cultural and religious values in the history of Western civilization.

Concerning the Irish bases, they were important enough in the last war to help keep ships moving into England. It is not a question merely of defending the present route to England. It is a question of opening other routes so far as possible, and above all of meeting the attacks of the fast submarine and the long-range bomber now operating far out to the west of Ireland. The disquieting shipping losses in the Atlantic must be checked. Germany today enjoys the use of bases in Norway, Holland and France which she did not have in the last war. England, on the other hand, now has many fewer bases than she had then. I believe that all the evidence a layman is capable of weighing bears out the contention of the British Admiralty that the Irish bases are of great importance to the defense of England's lifeline.

I admitted in my article that this gift of the bases entailed risks of war. General Aiken has chosen to ignore this section of the article completely. Ireland was asked to coöperate with the other democracies in the elimination of a gang of criminals engaged in the systematic destruction of the international community. Moreover, the alternative for Ireland today is not war or peace. Ireland can either assist the United States and Great Britain to destroy Nazism, or she can enjoy a temporary and precarious neutrality (occasionally interrupted by Nazi bombers over Dublin) and go down into slavery if Britain collapses.

Grand Rapids, Mich. FRANCIS E. MCMAHON

Unions and Government

SIR: The national-defense program is forcing many of us to refocus our view of the labor scene. In light of this, may I add a thought to the consideration of New York City's transit situation. More pertinent right now than the broad question of the rights of government employees is the question of the rights of workers when government takes over an industry already unionized. The rights of government employees to organize, to bargain collectively, to strike—these make up a twilight land on which more and more light is being shed. But we are now faced with a new problem on which there is no light at all. What happens when government takes over a plant? Will it adjust wages, to bring them into line with what other civil-service employees are being paid? Does the union that organized the plant after long and heartbreaking strife have any equity? What happens to its contracts? Is the closed shop suddenly opened in its face? These are questions that are being placed before us, and we may expect the tempo to increase after Inglewood. In New York City, where the Transport Workers' Union and the LaGuardia administration wrangle over subway contracts, answers to some of these questions will soon be forthcoming. They will be well worth listening to.

New York City MORTON YARMON

Taxing Inheritance Trusts

SIR: Recent suggestions in your columns for increasing tax revenue at the expense of vested interests seem to me to overlook one very pregnant possibility, the taxation of the income of trust estates while continuing the tax on the beneficiary for the income he receives from the trust. My suggestion as to the rate would be something relatively small, such as five percent, with graduations based not on the size of the trust, but on the degree to which it is tied up. For instance, a trust for a surviving widow of the settlor that ceases to exist at her death would be taxed at a lesser rate than one that would attempt to take care of unborn issue of the settlor's grandchildren.

Such a tax would probably be held by the present Supreme Court to be constitutional, though there is undoubtedly some argument that it is double taxation and violative of due process. I have very little idea as to the amount of revenue such a tax would produce, but I do know that in Pittsburgh the assets of the trust departments of our large banking enterprises are approximately two-thirds of the amount of deposits.

Regardless of the amount of the revenue, however, this tax would have one extremely beneficial result in that it would counteract at least in some measure a very bad tendency of our present tax laws. Federal taxes offer undue encouragement to the growth of trusts, and with the coming of the corporate fiduciary (at common law a corporation could not be a trustee) ever larger amounts are being tied up in trusts. This drying up of venture capital is unsound capitalistic economics. The static trust

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with undetermined beneficiaries, or with beneficiaries that are not *sui juris*, frequently works great deprivations on the very people whom it is intended to protect. The only purpose that most of these trusts really serve is that of tax avoidance, hardly a socially desirable end.

Such a tax as this would at least in some measure lessen the advantages to be gained from the setting up of trusts, and it would offer the possibility (by future increase in rates) of limiting and destroying the more socially undesirable forms much more effectively than the common law rule against perpetuities.

Pittsburgh, Pa. ALBERT D. BRANDON

The Wolf Child

SIR: The review by Bergen Evans of Arnold Gesell's volume "Wolf Child and Human Child," which appeared in the May 26 issue of The New Republic, is so irresponsible both in tone and content that, so far as Mr. Evans is concerned, it might well be passed over in silence. But for the benefit of your readers, a few facts should be put into the record.

The authenticity of the Rev. J. A. L. Singh's diary account of the wolf children was established by:

1. The attestation of an English magistrate, Judge E. Waight, District Judge of Midnapore, who vouched for the veracity of the Rev. Singh and affixed the official stamp of his court to the manuscript of the diary.

2. The affidavit of a clerk of court who typed the manuscript.

3. The preface to the diary by the eminent Bishop H. Pakenham-Walsh (see British Who's Who), who twice saw the wolf girl, Kamala, before she died.

4. The death certificate signed by a physician, Dr. S. P. Sarbadhicari, who attended Kamala, together with a verifying statement by his son.

5. The confirmatory documentation of a score of unretouched photographs taken over a period of years.

6. The internal evidence of the diary itself, which is consistent with what is known concerning the nature of child development.

7. Three years of study of the records and circumstances of the case by detailed checking through voluminous correspondence with numerous persons.

These objective facts are sufficient to negate the "review," which was written with such extraordinary literary license by the instructor of English.

ROBERT M. ZINGG

Department of Anthropology, University of Denver

SIR: Dr. Zingg does not understand nature of evidence:

1. and 2. merely indicate that certain persons believed that the Rev. Singh kept a diary. Their attestations are irrelevant to the facts mentioned in the diary.

3. Bishop Pakenham-Walsh may be in Who's Who but he wasn't in the wolf den and all he could possibly testify was that he was shown a child which he was told was a wolf child.

4. I have read the doctor's statement. It says that he attended a child dying of kidney trouble and that he was told she was a wolf child.

5. I have seen reproductions of most of the photographs. They prove beyond doubt that someone had a camera with which he took some pictures of a dark-skinned child in various attitudes. My authority for saying that one of them was retouched was a statement to that effect under that same picture when it was published in Scientific American by Dr. Zingg in March, 1941.

6. Since this is said to be the only documented, detailed account of a wolf child known, against what could the "internal evidence" of the diary be checked?

7. In his article in Scientific American, Dr. Zingg said that "the records in this case involve 250 pages of original documents, mostly a lengthy and carefully recorded diary." Making any reasonable deduction for "mostly," what becomes of the "voluminous correspondence" which required three years of study and checking?

So much for Dr. Zingg's "objective facts." Why did he not disprove the conflicting account of the children given by the Rev. John Howard of Midnapore or explain what he meant by his own statement in The American Journal of Psychology (October, 1940) that he had "unfortunately been unable to get in touch with scientists in India to check and recheck the cases"?

Wherein was my review "irresponsible"? I at least looked up Midnapore in an atlas, which is more than Dr. Zingg apparently did. The incredible statements, the malapropisms, the redundancies in my review were not mine but were quoted from Dr. Gesell's book. If I laughed, it was because I thought the book laughable and I gave my reasons for thinking so.

I am a man of more responsibilities than Dr. Zingg dreams of. When, for instance, there appeared in The American Weekly for May 18, 1941, a luridly illustrated two-page spread about Lukas, the baboon boy of South Africa, headlined as "Investigated by R. M. Zingg, Distinguished Anthropologist," with the assurance that Dr. Zingg, after "careful search," had "established" the "truth of the matter," I wrote to protest. For Dr. Zingg had published (American Journal of Psychology, July, 1940) a complete denial of that story, a frank admission that it had proved to be a hoax and a fraud, and I could not believe that *almost a year later* he would allow it to be republished as true on his authority. I am sure that Dr. Zingg also protested and commenced legal proceedings against The American Weekly, although notice of any such action on his part has not yet come to my attention.

Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. BERGEN EVANS

From The New Republic Mail Bag

The American Civil Liberties Union is asking Governor Leon C. Phillips to investigate charges that George Crooms, attorney for Ina Wood in the notorious criminal-syndicalism trial at Oklahoma City, was arrested when he stopped to talk to a Negro worker on a road, held for questioning without charges for twenty-four hours and his private records seized. The ACLU also calls upon Attorney General Robert H. Jackson to investigate the part the FBI is said to have played in the case.

Archibald B. Shepperson, editor, writes that The Virginia Quarterly Review is carrying an article, "Denken und Leben," by Thomas Mann, in German and without translation.

Walter White, secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, sends us material which he believes casts considerable doubt on the guilt of Bob White, who was shot by W. S. Cochran in a courtroom in Conroe, Texas, where White was on trial for the third time, charged with the rape of Cochran's wife. "Negroes are interested in defending this country and democracy," Mr. White writes, "but when a man can be shot and killed in a courtroom within full sight of armed guards and officers of the court, and the killer released on the low bail of $500, we seriously question how much democracy there is to defend."

E. H. Faulkner, 427 Ninth Street, Elyria, Ohio, says his letter in the April 21 issue of The New Republic concerning the advantages of the disc harrow over the plow brought many inquiries. . . . Ann L. Mitchell, secretary of the Euthanasia Society of America, Inc., says the society wants to put itself on record, regarding our May 5 article on "Germany Executes Her Unfit," "as being shocked at this wholesale slaughter of innocents."

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Books in Review

William L. Shirer Speaking

IN SEPTEMBER, 1937, William L. Shirer was given the job of arranging broadcasts for CBS from the continent of Europe. It was better than working in Hearst's Berlin office, as he had previously been doing; it meant more novelty, travel and excitement. One moment he would be on the telephone calling Rome or Warsaw; the next he would be rushing for a taxi that would carry him to the airport. From Ljubljana, where a chorus of miners' children sang for the Columbia School of the Air, he got back to Vienna just in time to see the Nazis march in; then he flew to London to give the first uncensored eyewitness account of the invasion, besides putting together one of the first European news round-ups. There was always something "first" in those days when the world was moving epileptically from one crisis into another, with the greatest crisis only a year ahead.

But after the war began, his horizon became more restricted. He could no longer visit the Allied countries and no news was being made in the cities that Hitler had seized; Shirer was reduced to traveling between his office in Berlin and his wife's home in Geneva, with an occasional tour of the front—to that and his daily report into the microphone while the censors listened to see that he didn't change a word of the approved text. There was less and less that they would permit him to tell. At first they had understood only German and English, so that he was able to speak his mind in American. Then there were new censors educated in America, but they merely read his script, and afterwards he tried to convey his real meaning by the intonation of his Midwestern voice. That brought a new official, who scanned his speeches like poems and suspiciously noted the words he emphasized. More and more he was being confined to the material in the official communiqués, which he knew to be false; and he was feeling a deeper hatred for the Nazis, especially after they took him to visit Paris as a conquered city. Back in Berlin, he could no longer conceal his loathing, and he knew that it was time for him to go home.

To most of us in America he had been only a radio voice, one of the many that recorded the daily disintegration of our world. Perhaps "William L. Shirer speaking from Berlin" sounded a little more human than the other radio voices, and perhaps, if one listened carefully, he had a little more to say, within the limits imposed by the censors. But Shirer as a private observer had a great deal more to say, and now has said it in a journal of six hundred pages,[1] containing almost everything that the Nazis cut out of his broadcasts. It is one of the most interesting war books that I have read: the first full record of wartime life in Germany.

Here are some items from his story, picked more or less at random:

During the German offensive, the great motor roads near the Dutch frontier were lined with broken-down farm implements arranged to look like anti-aircraft guns. . . . The flying fields were so well camouflaged that even German pilots had a hard time finding them. . . . The gulf that used to exist between officers and men had almost completely disappeared in the German army and even in the navy. Privates and captains ate the same food and drank beer in the same cafés, at the same tables. . . . The Germans had the Red Cross painted on the tops of their gasoline trucks and many of their staff cars. . . . Except in the towns, northern France after the German conquest showed no signs of any serious fighting. And some of the towns were untouched—at Verdun, not a house was harmed. . . .

Hitler was convinced in June, 1940, that the British would surrender without fighting, and therefore waited until the last week in July before preparing his offensive. One of the first steps was to build reviewing stands for the victory parade that would pass through the Brandenburg Gate. . . . The next step, the military prelude to invasion, was to destroy the Royal Air Force; Goering thought in August that he could finish the job in two weeks. The English fooled him by refusing to send up all their fighter planes on any one day, in spite of the attack on London. Also they fooled him by avoiding the Messerschmitts and attacking only the German bombers. . . . On the day the English destroyed 185 German planes, there had been a mistake in the timetable, and the bombers reached London without an escort. They fell like apples in a windstorm. . . .

The mother of a German aviator was notified that her son was missing and must be presumed dead. A few days later the BBC, which used to read off a weekly list of German prisoners, announced that her son had been captured. Eight of her friends wrote to tell her the good news. She gave the letters to the police and all eight were arrested for listening to an English broadcast. . . . At the end of 1940, the Germans were making 1,500 to 1,600 planes a month; their top capacity was 3,000, if the factories worked twenty-four hours a day. Not a square foot had been added to aircraft plant since the beginning of the war. . . . Potatoes, cabbage and bread were plentiful and apparently the country was in no danger of starvation. Civilian morale was high; army morale was "fantastically good." . . .

Before leaving Berlin, Shirer was told about the "mercy killings" of mental defectives—first reported in The New Republic by Michael Straight—and managed to collect a good deal of evidence. He found that the death notices of many victims were printed in German provincial newspapers; always the notices described them as having died "suddenly" or "unexpectedly" and as having been cremated at one of three places—Grafeneck in Württemberg, Pirna in Saxony, or Hartheim, near Linz on the Danube. The form letter sent to their families read in part: "Considering the nature of his serious, incurable ailment, his death, which saved him from lifelong confinement in an institution, is to be regarded merely as a release." Shirer believes that these killings were suggested to Hitler by the Nazi extremists, as a logical step in their program of purifying the race.

[1] Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, by William L. Shirer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 633 pages. $3.

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There are two conclusions that he carried home with him from Germany, neither of them startling to those who have been following the reports from Europe, but both of them supported by the facts he gathered during his six years in Berlin and by the force of his personal conviction. The first is that the Germans as a nation share the war guilt that is often assigned to Hitler as an individual. It is true that they didn't want the war, but they wanted to be masters of Europe, and now that mastery has been achieved they are enjoying its fruits in anticipation and are terrified of what would happen if their nation should be defeated. It is the national idea far more than the totalitarian idea for which they are fighting. Shirer's second conclusion is that there is certain to be war between Germany and the United States unless this country is willing to accept not only the totalitarian system but a place in that system subordinate to Germany. How and where the attack will be launched, if Britain falls, he does not pretend to know. He has believed for a long time, however, that Hitler could begin by settling his account with Stalin. Then he would turn west; and many Germans told Shirer that his road would be through Africa to Brazil. They said, "Once we are established in South America the battle is won."

MALCOLM COWLEY

Love Everlasting

Then Shall the Dust Return, by Julian Green. Translated from the French by James Whitall. New York: Harper and Brothers. 290 pages. $2.50.
A Fish Dinner in Memison, by E. R. Eddison. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 350 pages. $2.50.

TWO MORE DISSIMILAR NOVELISTS than Julian Green and E. R. Eddison would be hard to imagine; yet their new books develop the same theme—the relationship between human destiny and eternity. However, in conception, mood, style and story, the books are antithetical. Mr. Green believes that "our lives can be explained only if they are related to those that preceded them and to those that follow them, like the words of a long sentence, the whole meaning of which is known only to God." So his novel covers a thousand years and three sets of characters, linked by a symbolic chain, flashback dreams and visions. (The chain is in another guise Eddison's Worm Ouroboros, the serpent swallowing its tail, a symbol of eternity.) By a sort of transmigration all owners of the chain are identical.

In early medieval times, Hoel, son of a Welsh fisherman, finds the chain. He is a Tyl Ulenspiegl rogue, rough and lusty and full of tricks. His life and the telling of it resemble fairy tales about the woodchopper's son seeking his fortune. Hoel never wins his predestined love. He dies murmuring the first words of the Lord's Prayer.

The next characters are wealthy middle class, in mid-sixteenth-century Arras. Again the lovers are confounded, for they are father and daughter. The man, believing his daughter, Helene, to be his wife returned from the grave, tries to win her love by sorcery. But death defeats him, and Helene enters a nunnery. In setting, personalities and dissectional treatment this part is reminiscent of Green's novels of psychopathic provincial people, will-less creatures of fate.

The third part—the intellectual phase—is a diary (1903 to 1914) kept by a neurotic Frenchwoman who is working on a novel about the people in Part 2. As Jeanne immerses herself in their history, she mystically identifies herself with Helene. A self-searching, hypersensitive person, she becomes convinced of the continuity of existence and the inevitable unity of her and her husband's destinies. So the lovers have found each other—and the publisher can offer "a love story by Julian Green with a happy ending." This episode, too, concludes on a religious note. Jeanne, who too frequently speaks for the author, reiterates that "we come out of darkness to return to darkness without in the smallest degree understanding our destiny." Which is the message Mr. Green has been conveying for a good many years.

Though broader in conception and scope, more original and versatile, than "The Closed Garden" or "The Dark Journey," the present novel is not so diabolically compelling—its scheme and variety preclude their accumulative intensity, the Catholic symbolism confuses the major theme, and the final section is weak. The story is finished, but seems unresolved, and the love of Jeanne and Louis is an inadequate climax to centuries of unfulfilled destinies. The book must be considered a *tour de force.*

Mr. Eddison's concept is that "ultimate reality rests in a Masculine-Feminine dualism, in which the old trinity of Truth, Beauty, Goodness is extended to embrace the whole of Being and Becoming; Truth consisting in this—that Infinite and Omnipotent Love creates, preserves and delights in, Infinite and Perfect Beauty." Everything mundane partakes of the eternal dualism (Zeus and Aphrodite); but the world is merely a prelude to immortality. As a Valhalla for those who lived according to divine ethics Eddison has created the land of Zimiamvia.

Eddison's novels have been called four-dimensional and beyond all dimensions; in them space and time are infinite and elastic. In "A Fish Dinner" characters and events in England from 1903 to 1933 are mirrored in Zimiamvia, where the thirty years are only a month. The book is an epithalamion for three pairs of lovers—one in England, two in Memison. Their stories develop simultaneously, with the transitions from world to world becoming more frequent, incidents and settings paralleling, the British Mary and Edward growing more aware of their identity with the other lovers in some future and eternal, yet contemporaneous existence. The culminating fish dinner, a Platonic symposium, lasts ten years, ten million years, ten minutes, and during it the lovers are so intermingled in space and time that they are one pair, infused with the divinity of Zeus and Aphrodite. For in Zimiamvia the highest philosophic truth becomes actual—love is supreme goddess, served by beauty, and that is the true good.

This is romance in classic form—idyllic, sensuous, sublime. Even the villains are heroic; settings are lavish and lush, conversations lofty and wise. The modern prose is suitably unpretentious. For Memison the English is Elizabethan, so well recreated and felicitous that it seems normal in that enchanted other-world. Because of its philosophic and literary altitude, the book can't be read casually, and it is sometimes indigestibly rich. But it is a masterpiece of imaginative, aristocratic, poetic romance—so rare now as to be almost extinct.

DOROTHY CHAMBERLAIN

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Russian Aftermath

Workers Before and After Lenin: Fifty Years of Russian Labor, by Manya Gordon. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 524 pages. $4.

"WORKERS BEFORE AND AFTER LENIN" is written around a thesis. "Under the autocracy the standard of living among Russia's masses was lower than in western Europe, but . . . at no time were the people as destitute as they were after twenty-two years of Soviet rule. . . ." This thesis may be startling to those who have absorbed "Soviet Civilization," or who believe in revelation, but it is one for which there is considerable factual evidence. The sources of information cited are almost exclusively the same as those used in more glamorous accounts; reliance is placed almost wholly on Soviet authorities. But the statistics are subjected to some critical examination, and much attention is given to interpretation of the new Soviet language in which, as Professor Harper has observed, familiar terms are used "with meanings often different from those associated with the same words when applied to Western parliamentary systems." This is not to say that the author devotes fourteen pages, as did the Webbs, to drawing a nice distinction between "competition" and "emulation"; it is rather that curious concepts such as "socialized wages" and social insurance received by wage earners "for nothing" are translated into the commonplace language of deductions from workers' payrolls. The painstaking care with which the author tries to get at the latent truth with respect to labor unions, wages real and imaginary, housing, clothing, factory conditions, social security, industrialization, education and peasant conditions in the Soviet Union will be obvious to the reader and merits praise. But the effort is in certain respects marred.

The depressing picture impels even the author in quest of a personal devil, and the major thesis occasionally degenerates into the suggestion that Stalin, surrounded by "grafters," is driven by "gross ignorance" to cover his tragic crimes, and that Stalin's "accusations have not been directed against his real adversary, who is none other than Lenin." Yet it is obvious, from many other passages, that Manya Gordon does not really believe that Stalin has betrayed Lenin, "the supreme phrase maker," nor would her facts support such a thesis. Elsewhere it is Trotsky who is singled out as Stalin's "real opponent," though the author has no other use for "the astute Trotsky."

The yearning for a scapegoat, combined with what seems to this reviewer an unhappy plan of organization, eliminates any adequate discussion of the fundamental reasons for the drab aftermath of the Russian Revolution. Topical treatment, with no discussion of the political and ideological framework, compels the author to go over the same ground many times, without ever properly clarifying the interrelation of simultaneous developments. The importance of the basic poverty of Russia is only occasionally adumbrated. Too much is left to the imagination, and assumption too often replaces demonstration.

To anyone who has consistently read Pravda for any considerable period, most of the contents of this book will inevitably have a familiar ring. Yet the echo reverberating through these pages is not free from serious distortion. It almost seems that there is something in the nature of Soviet statistics that infects those who handle them. The results of a random sampling of references are disheartening. For example, the sparkling version of Bernard Shaw's radio comments, for which Pravda is cited as authority, is not what Pravda did attribute to him; the author has retranslated some of the words, but has taken impermissible liberties with their arrangement. Nor is this the only case of gross mis-citation. Even assuming that chance has disclosed the only instances of this sort, an indictment of such proportions should have been made foolproof.

JESSE D. CLARKSON

Summons to Revolution

The Majority of the People: A Grammar of Democracy, by Edwin Mims Jr. New York: Modern Age Books. 314 pages. $2.75.

WHEN WE SAY, as most of us have been saying for a long while, that the majority has a right to govern, and then add, as we usually do, that the rights of minorities must nevertheless be protected at all costs, do we or do we not contradict ourselves?

The author of "The Majority of the People" answers roundly that we do not; that the rights to which minorities are really entitled are safer under a system of unrestricted majority rule than they can possibly be under any other system, and that our inability (as a people) to grasp this simple truth is responsible for our conspicuous failure to realize the American dream. For, he argues, in the absence

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Edited by John Dewey and Horace M. Kallen

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of widespread popular doubts regarding the capacity of the majority to safeguard the rights of minorities, the Supreme Court would never have made good its claim to act as their custodian; and if this claim had never been made good, the numerical majority of our population could never have been divorced from ownership of the means of production; and if the majority of our population had never been so divorced, we should have been spared the huge concentrations of corporate wealth which today withhold from our people the plenty which their economic system is capable of producing. The remedy, therefore, lies in the dispossessed majority; let it cast aside its doubts regarding its capacity to govern, let it move with all possible haste to withdraw the legal privileges through which a numerical minority maintains its stranglehold upon the nation's economic and political life. Let it, finally, use its freshly won power over government "to bring about a situation in which a larger and larger percentage of the national population [participates] in a system of larger and larger-scale production and distribution and consumption."

This is, of course, merely another way of stating the familiar Marxian demand for the expropriation of the expropriators; and Mims, unlike Max Lerner (whom he takes to task for his failure to face the fact), is well aware that it is a summons to revolution. He is aware too, I think, that the whole position depends upon an implied distinction between those rights to which minorities are entitled as a matter of course (*i. e.*, such freedoms as they must possess if they are to have an equal chance to convert themselves into majorities) and those rights to which they are entitled only when the majority confers them, and only until the majority sees fit to withdraw them.

What he is not aware of, in my opinion, is the fact that, by the time he has done with this distinction, he is making a plea not for majority rule (= government by *the* numerical majority of the community, thus *any* numerical majority of the community), but for a particular type of economic policy—namely, withdrawal of the legal right to ownership of large accumulations of property. That this is true may be seen from the fact that he invariably identifies majority rule with rule by the numerous poor—rule not by *the* majority but by *a particular majority*, selected with an eye to its probable willingness to withdraw a particular minority privilege. This way of getting at the problem brusques the fact that the richest 51 percent of the community, equally with the poorest, constitute a majority, and that if you mean majority rule, you mean that you are willing to take your chances on where the line falls which divides the majority from the minority. And if you don't mean that, you don't mean majority rule.

But Mims's book is not, as the above paragraphs might seem to imply, merely a tract for the times. It is also a venture in the history of American political ideas, and as such may well force the entire generation whose minds were changed by Beard's "Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" to change their minds back again. He shows, with a wealth of documentation which should confound his critics, that "the further we proceed toward the headwaters of our political tradition, the further we proceed in the direction of a simple, self-contained, carefully constructed philosophy of majority rule"; that the republic had grown to full maturity before men began to think in terms of a conflict between majority rule and the rights of minorities; and that, therefore, the chief anti-majoritarian features of our political system are the handiwork not of its founders but of an interested eighteenth-century minority of large property-owners. While he is not entirely consistent on these points (see, for example, p. 8, where he says as clearly as possible that our system of government was "in its inception basically anti-majoritarian"), he does offer to those of us who believe in majority rule the opportunity of muscling in on the anti-majoritarians' monopoly of the political magic which surrounds the names of the founding fathers.

WILLMOORE KENDALL

Too Much of Too Little

Low Man on a Totem Pole, by H. Allen Smith. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 317 pages. $2.50.

GOOD FEATURE WRITERS on newspapers are as hard to find as feature writers on newspapers are common, and H. Allen Smith writing in The New York World-Telegram is usually too hard to find. He puts up a book for us here that is partly a collection of stuff he has already printed and partly a series of rambling accounts of how he got it. And partly autobiographical, but only that part of experience which deals with early newspaper work, a fascinating subject. Smith seems to have been born young and to have started on papers at an early age among some interesting veteran types. Subsequently he was always among interesting types too. If it seems, as it sometimes does in books of this kind indeed, that somebody else is always running into the people who are fun, perhaps the answer is that it takes one to tell one, *i. e.*, a very boring person usually never meets anybody exciting at all; a man like Smith could make very good copy out of practically any dull or disagreeable types, and does.

However, I don't think he's quite got a book here. One of the best titles of the year, and an introduction by Fred Allen, but as a book it runs light. He has strip-teasers, movie stars, a girl hog caller, a girl who can wiggle anywhere and call her shots, fighters, bartenders, radio people, a philosopher. He has interviewed these people and he tells you what they tell him—but he goes a step farther and tells you what he tells them, he goes behind the scenes of getting behind the scenes, that is, and quite a little of the book is devoted to the problems and adventures of procuring copy for the papers. But there is not enough of most of the people to make a rounded profile; there is not enough shop talk to make a clear picture of a man at work. Some of the people are inconsequential to start with, of course, but it is the business of the author to select and edit, and make every piece printed justify itself. And some of the topics have been done better too many times—Jimmie Durante, for example, Hollywood, the recording-studio bits. "Bowen of the INS" is a fine piece and I am grateful at last to get a full account of Jim Moran, the man who put the bull in the china shop and the needles in the haystack and de-Bunkered the legend of "don't fire till you see the whites of their eyes." I liked the partial account of Harlem's Black Eagle and such scraps as the expanded interview with Maxie Rosenbloom and Miss De Havilland's autograph hunter. But the mixture is uneven and

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there is too much of too little, so that there is a sense of being full without having had anything particular to eat. You aren't dissatisfied—though the tailpiece "My Hobby" has no place outside a course in the light, or familiar, essay—but for a writer like H. Allen Smith you are vaguely disappointed. He looked pretty good and he *is* pretty good, but on this one he just wasn't ready. OTIS FERGUSON

Journey to the Threshold

Against This Torrent, by Edward Mead Earle. Princeton University Press. 73 pages. $1.

THIS IS THE BEST SHORT STATEMENT I have read anywhere defending the historical basis of President Roosevelt's foreign policy. Mr. Earle shows that the United States has not only always been affected by European affairs, but often actively involved in them. The Founding Fathers saw our national interests bound up, on occasion, with European interests; when we entered the last war we did so on the basis of the same practical, selfish considerations that led us to fight the Revolution and the War of 1812. The present worldwide conflict threatens us with far graver external dangers than we have ever had to meet before. The Axis powers are gradually encircling us; Berlin is the heart and brains of the Axis; Britain is our only remaining shield. Mr. Earle agrees with Wendell Willkie that a British defeat would be a "calamity for us" in giving the Axis control of the seas. He concludes with a plea to military men to interest themselves more in civilian affairs and to civilians to interest themselves more in military affairs. To be secure we must move soon and fast.

Why hasn't the United States moved sooner or faster? The fault certainly does not lie with our pamphleteers. My private suspicion is that we in 1941—like Britain in 1940—need a Dunkirk of our own to awaken us to realities. Words of exhortation, reason, emotion or alarm simply cannot turn the trick. Nothing short of a national disaster will do. Perhaps one reason why words are inadequate is that those who write them as well as those who read them have not kept pace with the sweep of events. Even Mr. Earle, with all his realistic appraisal of our present position and all the wealth of historical precedent he cites, offers little in explanation of Hitler's strength or Britain's weakness. It does not seem to occur to him that the industrialization of Russia, China and India and the development of substitute products in the more advanced nations may have already destroyed the world in which we and the British once played such a happy and prosperous part.

There is little in Mr. Earle's book with which any man of good will or good sense can quarrel. The trouble is that it does not go nearly far enough—even in its own terms. The Axis threatens the United States: granted. The kind of world the Axis is creating is not the kind of world in which Americans want to live: granted. But to stop the Axis powers we must discover in our own system the weak spots which they understand better than we do, and to build the world we want we must discover and adapt the strong points in their system. Mr. Earle's book brings the reader to the threshold I have just indicated. Now he must go a few steps farther. Otherwise it will be another case of too little and too late. QUINCY HOWE

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A Reader's List

DIPLOMAT BETWEEN WARS, by Hugh R. Wilson (Longmans, Green, $3). In his second volume of memoirs the latest United States ambassador to Germany covers the years from 1917 through 1937, surveying two crucial decades of history and his own diplomatic career. Politically, it is a cautious and somewhat too tactfully conventional book. As a diplomat's family album it is interesting and worth reading.

MARIAN ANDERSON, by Kosti Vehanen (Whittlesey House, $2.50). An intimate portrait of the great Negro singer, written by a Finnish musician who was her accompanist for ten years. The book begins with Miss Anderson's first successes in Scandinavia and ends with the spectacular recital in Washington where, refused a concert hall by the Daughters of the American Revolution, she sang before the Lincoln Memorial to an enthusiastic audience of 75,000.

THE PRINCESS, by Phil Stong (Farrar and Rinehart,$2.50). Phil Stong comes across with a pretty story about a girl on an Iowa farm, where she is raised by her older brother and the hired man exclusively. This peculiar upbringing makes her a first-rate farmer but has its disadvantages too. A pleasant, steadily readable book—Mr. Stong's good writing seems by now to be a habit—but rather less substantial than some of his earlier books.

LAMPS AT HIGH NOON, by J. S. Balch (Modern Age, $2.50).The hero of this first novel is a young writer, broke and disgusted till he lands a job as assistant director of his local writers' project. Lots of strange experiences follow, not all of them strictly relevant to the business of composing a guidebook. An uneven work, with patches of unnecessary sentiment, fine views of some very odd characters, and bits of home life that could slip easily into a Clifford Odets first act.

THOSE TORN FROM EARTH, by Frederick Hollander (Liveright, $2.50). A refugee novel about a highly cultured group of Germans, forced to leave their country for racial and political reasons. Though rather loosely constructed and not too successful in its individual characterizations, the basic refugee problem is thoroughly understood and presented convincingly.

Contributors

CHARLES R. WHITTLESEY is professor of Finance and Economics at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of "Golden Avalanche" and has contributed to The Quarterly Journal of Economics and to Foreign Affairs.

CAREY MCWILLIAMS, author of "Factories in the Field," is the California State Commissioner of Immigration and Housing. He has just finished a book for Little, Brown which deals with the problem of agricultural migration and migratory workers in the United States.

H. N. BRAILSFORD, London correspondent of The New Republic, is now in this country on a brief visit.

SYLVIA TOWNSEND WARNER is the British novelist and poet whose latest book, "The Cat's Cradle Book," was recently published by the Viking Press.

HANSON W. BALDWIN is the military expert of The New York Times and author, among other books, of "United We Stand! Defense of the Western Hemisphere," recently published by Whittlesey House.

DOROTHY CHAMBERLAIN is on the editorial staff of Good Housekeeping. She has written for The New York Times and The Baltimore Sun.

JESSE D. CLARKSON is chairman of the Department of History at Brooklyn College.

WILLMOORE KENDALL teaches political science and economics at Hobart College. The University of Illinois Press will soon release his first book, "John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule."

QUINCY HOWE is news commentator for Station WQXR, New York, and the author, among other books, of "The News and How to Understand It."

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